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Improved digital connectivity has made the Internet an important medium
for multimedia distribution and consumption in recent years. At the same time,
this increased proliferation of multimedia has raised significant challenges in se-
cure multimedia distribution and intellectual property protection. This dissertation
examines two complementary aspects of the multimedia protection problem that
utilize content fingerprints and embedded collusion-resistant fingerprints.
The first aspect considered is the automated identification of multimedia using
content fingerprints, which is emerging as an important tool for detecting copyright
violations on user generated content websites. A content fingerprint is a compact
identifier that captures robust and distinctive properties of multimedia content,
which can be used for uniquely identifying the multimedia object. In this disser-
tation, we describe a modular framework for theoretical modeling and analysis of
content fingerprinting techniques. Based on this framework, we analyze the impact
of distortions in the features on the corresponding fingerprints and also consider
the problem of designing a suitable quantizer for encoding the features in order
to improve the identification accuracy. The interaction between the fingerprint
designer and a malicious adversary seeking to evade detection is studied under a
game-theoretic framework and optimal strategies for both parties are derived. We
then focus on analyzing and understanding the matching process at the fingerprint
level. Models for fingerprints with different types of correlations are developed and
the identification accuracy under each model is examined. Through this analysis we
obtain useful guidelines for designing practical systems and also uncover connections
to other areas of research.
A complementary problem considered in this dissertation concerns tracing the
users responsible for unauthorized redistribution of multimedia. Collusion-resistant
fingerprints, which are signals that uniquely identify the recipient, are proactively
embedded in the multimedia before redistribution and can be used for identifying
the malicious users. We study the problem of designing collusion resistant finger-
prints for embedding in compressed multimedia. Our study indicates that directly
adapting traditional fingerprinting techniques to this new setting of compressed
multimedia results in low collusion resistance. To withstand attacks, we propose
an anti-collusion dithering technique for embedding fingerprints that significantly
improves the collusion resistance compared to traditional fingerprints.
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Multimedia consumption via the Internet has increased radically over the last
few years. The Internet has also emerged as an important medium for distribution of
multimedia content such as video and audio. Video streaming services are available
from such providers as Netflix, Blockbuster, Hulu, and Amazon. Services such as
Google TV and Apple TV that are being planned will further strengthen this trend.
Fueling this trend is the technological improvement in the bandwidth of network
connections, and the growing popularity of user-generated content (UGC) websites,
such as YouTube, which have changed the perspectives of both content providers
and consumers with regards to the Internet.
At the same time, this ease of access has brought significant challenges to
intellectual property protection, as the improved technology has made it easier to
redistribute copyrighted multimedia content to a large number of users. The pop-
ularity of UGC websites has also raised concerns about the posting of copyrighted
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content by users. The movie industry estimated that piracy and illicit redistribution
have caused over $6 billion loss annually in terms of lost revenue [80, 82].
The problem of secure distribution and protection of multimedia in the Internet
age raises significant technical challenges and various new technologies have been
developed to address these issues. In this dissertation, we examine two important
aspects of multimedia protection that rely on digital fingerprints.
1.1 Content Fingerprints for Multimedia Identification
One approach to protecting intellectual property rights is to reduce the num-
ber of avenues available for illicit multimedia redistribution. Most UGC websites
have adopted rules and policies that discourage users from uploading copyrighted
content and are seeking technological solutions for implementing these policies. A
technology that automatically identifies videos can enable UGC websites to filter out
copyrighted content and protect themselves from costly lawsuits and litigation. One
promising solution to this problem relies on a technology called content fingerprints.
A content fingerprint, in this context, is a compact signature that represents robust
and unique characteristics of the multimedia and can be used to identify the doc-
ument. For each video uploaded, the service provider can compute the fingerprint
and compare it with a database of fingerprints of copyrighted content, to decide
whether the video in question is copyrighted or not.
Content fingerprints are also used for identifying multimedia in a variety of
other applications in multimedia management. Fingerprints are employed by such
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services as Shazam, Midomi, VCAST, etc. to perform automatic music identifica-
tion. Given a noisy recording of an audio captured using a mobile device, these
services identify the original audio track and provide metadata information, such
as the album, options to buy the track, etc. Fingerprints have also been used to
perform automatic tagging of audio collections and create automatic playlists based
on user preferences [12].
The fingerprints utilized for identification should be robust, so that they are
not altered by benign processing or minor distortion of the multimedia, but should
be discriminative enough to distinguish between millions of different multimedia
objects. In many practical applications, fingerprint extraction and matching are
performed in real-time, which places constraints on the computation and memory
requirements of the identification system. A significant amount of research effort has
been focused on designing fingerprinting schemes with various robustness properties,
that employ different kinds of features, and provide varying tradeoffs between ro-
bustness, discrimination, and computational requirements. These schemes are then
evaluated using experiments on moderate sized databases.
While such experimental evaluations are important, they may not provide a
complete picture of how the performance scales when the same algorithm is used to
identify videos from a very large database with millions of hours of video. Also, the
understanding obtained from evaluating a particular fingerprinting scheme may not
help in predicting the performance of another scheme. To complement these experi-
mental evaluations, there is a strong need for a systematic analysis of fingerprinting
schemes that can help us obtain deeper insights and uncover connections to related
3
areas. Analysis can help us answer such fundamental questions as - “What is the
best possible identification accuracy achievable using any fingerprinting scheme?”,
“What properties should an optimal fingerprinting scheme have?”, “How should the
fingerprint be designed to resist attacks?”, “What is the impact of using module
X as opposed to module Y ?”, and others. Such an analysis can also guide the de-
sign of better fingerprinting schemes. A systematic study would also help identify
weaknesses of fingerprinting systems that may be exploited by smart attackers to
circumvent the system and allow suitable counter-attack strategies to be devised.
In this dissertation, we describe a modular framework for analyzing fingerprinting
systems that can help answer some of these questions.
1.2 Collusion-Resistant Fingerprints for Traitor Tracing
A complementary aspect of multimedia protection is to identify the user re-
sponsible for redistributing or pirating the content. This issue is not only important
in the context of movie piracy, but becomes a critical necessity in many applications
involving highly secure and classified documents. Consider, for example, a classified
video that only a select group of users has access to. An untrustworthy user may
leak this video to an outsider, or publish it via the internet. It then becomes nec-
essary to identify the user responsible for this leak. The presence of such a tracing
mechanism can also serve to deter and prevent users from redistributing classified
information in the first place.
Embedded fingerprints have emerged as an important forensic tool to combat
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such illegal redistribution of protected content. The main idea behind fingerprinting
is to embed a fingerprint signal in every legally distributed copy of the content that
uniquely identifies the recipient. When an unauthorized copy is discovered, the
embedded fingerprint can be extracted and used to identify the source of the leak.
While such a system may be effective at identifying single adversaries, multiple
malicious users may collaborate to launch powerful collusion attacks against the
fingerprinting system [103]. By comparing their different versions, the colluders
can attempt to identify the locations containing the fingerprint signal, remove the
information from these locations and thereby create a copy that cannot be traced
back to any of them.
Collusion-resistant fingerprints designed to withstand such attacks have been
proposed in the literature [83, 98]. These designs provide good collusion resistance
when embedded in uncompressed multimedia. In practical applications, multimedia
is widely stored and transmitted in compressed format, and it is often necessary to
embed fingerprints in compressed multimedia. Existing techniques, which are suit-
able for uncompressed multimedia, do not provide good resistance when adapted
to compressed host signals, and novel designs that explicitly account for the com-
pressed nature of the host are needed [86]. In this dissertation, we describe an
Anti-Collusion Dither based technique that can significantly improve the collusion
resistance of fingerprints embedded in compressed signals.
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1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
As described in the previous sections, the first contribution of this dissertation
is to develop models for and study the performance of content fingerprints. Chap-
ter 2 describes the overall modeling framework for theoretical analysis of content
fingerprints. Under this framework, modules that are typically utilized in finger-
printing algorithms are individually analyzed to understand their impact on the
overall identification performance. This can also be thought of as a layered or hi-
erarchical approach to modeling and designing content fingerprints, in terms of the
underlying multimedia content, the features extracted from the multimedia, encod-
ing the features to obtain compact fingerprints and the matching process. In the
same chapter, some aspects of the relations between the features used in construct-
ing the fingerprints and the final fingerprints obtained are examined. Specifically,
the impact of distortion in the feature domain on the fingerprint bits is studied.
An algorithm to optimize the design of the feature quantizer to improve the iden-
tification performance is described. Lastly, the interaction between the fingerprint
designer and the adversary is studied under a game-theoretic framework and the
optimal fingerprint bit distribution from the designer’s perspective is determined.
Chapters 3-5 then focus on, and examine in detail, the fingerprint matching
process, with progressively more complex models. In Chapter 3, a simple i.i.d.
model is adopted for the fingerprint bits. Fingerprint matching is modeled as a
hypothesis testing problem, and the best performance achievable using i.i.d. bits
is determined. Bounds are also derived on the length of the fingerprint needed to
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achieve a desired performance. As practical fingerprints have correlated compo-
nents, Chapter 4 describes a Markov Random Field based model that can capture
these correlations. A statistical physics based approach is developed to estimate
the identification accuracy under this model. Chapter 5 examines models to cap-
ture the temporal correlations among fingerprints that reflect the correlations of the
underlying multimedia. An adaptive detector is then proposed that improves the
matching accuracy.
In Chapters 6 and 7, the problem of designing collusion resistant fingerprints
for compressed multimedia is studied. In Chapter 6, the performance of tradi-
tional fingerprints designed for uncompressed multimedia when applied to com-
pressed multimedia is first examined. As the existing techniques result in low
collusion resistance, an Anti-Collusion Dithering(ACD) technique is described to
improve the overall collusion resistance, and the performance is studied via sim-
ulations and experiments. Chapter 7 then performs a theoretical analysis of the
collusion-resistant fingerprints for compressed multimedia from different perspec-
tives, and demonstrates that the proposed ACD technique is advantageous under
each of these criteria.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which summarizes the contributions of
the dissertation and discusses future perspectives.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Modeling and Analysis
of Content Fingerprinting
In recent years, user generated content (UGC) websites such as Youtube have
grown in popularity and revolutionized multimedia consumption and distribution.
Increasingly, the Internet is being seen as a medium for delivering multimedia con-
tent to consumers. These new distribution channels have made it easier to access
multimedia in digital form and redistribute it via the internet. Concerns have been
raised about the redistribution of copyrighted content, especially through UGC web-
sites [81]. To identify and filter such copyrighted videos, several UGC websites are
deploying content filtering schemes that rely on an emerging technology called con-
tent fingerprinting. A content fingerprint, is a compact identifier that represents
robust and unique characteristics of the multimedia and can be used to identify the
document. In this respects, it is similar in usage to a human fingerprint, and hence
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the name. The fingerprint of the uploaded video can be compared to a database of
fingerprints of copyrighted content to identify whether it is copyrighted or not.
Watermarking, which is a proactive technique wherein a special watermark
signal is embedded into the host at the time of content creation, can also be used
for content identification. This embedded signal can later be extracted and used
to identify the content and retrieve associated metadata [5]. Watermarking tech-
niques are suitable if the embedder has control over the content creation stage. This
requirement may be difficult to satisfy in many practical applications, including
content filtering on UGC sites. In particular, a large volume of existing multimedia
does not have embedded watermarks and cannot be identified using this approach.
Content fingerprints, on the other hand, do not require access to the content at the
time of creation and can be used to identify existing multimedia content that does
not have embedded information.
Content fingerprints are designed to be robust to minor content preserving op-
erations while being able to discriminate between different multimedia objects. At
the same time, the fingerprints must be compact to allow for efficient matching. In
this respect, content fingerprinting shares similarities with robust hashing [26, 78].
Traditionally, robust hashing was studied in the context of authentication, where
the main objective was to prevent an adversary from forging a valid hash for a given
image, and also prevent him/her from obtaining an image that has the same hash
as the given image. In contrast, while collisions or false alarms are also a concern in
content fingerprinting, the main threat model is an adversary making minor modifi-
cations to a given multimedia document that would result in a significantly different
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fingerprint and prevent identification. Another difference between fingerprinting and
robust hashing is that fingerprinting applications typically involve large databases
with millions of hours of video and audio, whereas traditional applications of im-
age hashing typically focus on authenticating a smaller set of images. However,
many hashing schemes with good robustness properties can be adapted for content
identification purposes and hence the terms “content fingerprinting” and “robust
hashing” are often used interchangeably in the literature.
Content fingerprinting has received a lot of interest from the research commu-
nity and different approaches for fingerprinting have been proposed, some of which
are reviewed in Section 2.1. Most of these works address the problem of designing
fingerprinting schemes that are robust to different kinds of processing and achieve
various tradeoffs between robustness, discrimination, and computational complex-
ity. Typically, these algorithms are designed based on heuristics and are evaluated
through experiments on moderately large databases. Some studies have also focused
on the modeling and analysis of certain modules employed for designing fingerprints,
but no overarching framework has been developed.
There is a strong need for theoretical modeling and analysis of the fingerprint-
ing problem that can provide deeper understanding and insight. For example, in
the field of data-hiding, the modeling of watermarking as communications with side
information [18] led to the development of schemes inspired by communication ap-
proaches with provable optimality properties [11]. A similar framework for content
fingerprints, that uncovers connections with other areas of research, can guide the
design of better fingerprinting algorithms. In this dissertation, we develop a frame-
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work that can provide a basis for further study and analysis, and answer some of
the fundamental questions regarding content fingerprints.
2.1 Prior Work on Content Fingerprinting
Content fingerprinting has attracted a lot of research and several audio and
video fingerprinting techniques have been proposed in the literature. A robust fin-
gerprinting technique for audio identification based on the signs of the differences
between the energy in different frequency bands of overlapping frames was proposed
in [30]. A similar approach for video, coupled with efficient indexing strategies was
proposed in [64]. Ranks of the block average luminance of sub-sampled frames were
used as fingerprints in [60], while signs of significant wavelet coefficients of spectro-
grams were used to construct fingerprints in [3]. Moment invariants that capture
appearance and motion were proposed as features for fingerprints in [68].
In the robust hashing literature, hash generation by quantizing projections
of images onto smooth random patterns was proposed in [26], which is used as a
building block in many fingerprint constructions such as [68]. Hashes resilient to
geometric transforms based on properties of Fourier transform coefficients were pro-
posed in [78]. Spatiotemporal video hashes based on 3-D transforms were proposed
in [15]. Several other hashing schemes with different robustness properties have been
proposed in the literature. A comparative study of a few representative algorithms
was performed in [46]. A survey of various fingerprinting and hashing algorithms
proposed in the literature may be found in [53].
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Regarding theoretical aspects of fingerprinting, qualitative guidelines for de-
signing multimedia hash functions were provided in [56], with a focus on bit assign-
ment and the use of suitable error-correcting codes to improve the robustness. Ro-
bust hashing was considered as a classification problem in [95]. As a null-hypothesis
and false alarms were not explicitly considered in the formulation of [95], the anal-
ysis cannot be directly applied to the problem of content identification. In the
related field of biometrics, the capacity of biometrics-based identification was stud-
ied in [101]. Capacity was defined as the maximum rate R such that 2LR distinct
biometrics could be identified with an asymptotic error probability of zero, as the
length of the fingerprints L → ∞. However, as noted in [101], while designing
practical systems, we are more interested in determining the best performance ob-
tainable using a given length of the fingerprint, which is one of the contributions of
our study. Subsequent to the results described in Chapter 3, which were summa-
rized in [88], a similar analysis applicable to fingerprints over general alphabets was
described in [62].
Most of these prior works focused on the design and analysis of particular
modules used in fingerprint and robust hash designs. In this dissertation, we describe
a holistic framework for modeling and analysis of fingerprints, and study different
aspects of the fingerprint problem.
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Figure 2.1: Framework for modeling content fingerprints.
2.2 Framework for Modeling Content Fingerprints
In this section, we describe the overall framework for analyzing various con-
tent fingerprinting schemes [84]. Practical algorithms for fingerprinting proposed
in the literature may employ different building blocks, but they typically follow
the general framework shown in Figure 2.1. Given the multimedia data, features
that capture distinctive properties of the multimedia are extracted. These features
should be robust to distortions of the underlying signal, so that they can be reliably
extracted from a distorted version of the original content, while being distinctive
enough to distinguish diverse multimedia objects. Robust properties of the signal
in various domains, such as spatial, temporal or transform domain, may be used
as features [53]. In many practical applications with stringent requirements on the
computational complexity, simpler, easy-to-compute features may be preferred [53].
Some commonly used image/video features, such as interest point based features,
13
block average luminance, and color histograms are illustrated in the second block of
Figure 2.1.
The extracted features are typically quantized and compactly encoded as bits
or integers to obtain the fingerprint, as illustrated in the third block of Figure 2.1.
The computed fingerprints are then stored in the reference database for later use.
Given a multimedia object that needs to be identified, features are extracted and
encoded to form the query fingerprint, which is then matched with the fingerprints
in the reference database to identify the multimedia. For the matching process,
exhaustively comparing the query with every fingerprint in the database is optimal,
but may incur high computational cost. Instead, efficient approximate matching
schemes, such as Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) and k-D trees may be used in
practice.
The accuracy of a given fingerprinting algorithm for different genres of multi-
media is influenced by each module. To understand the overall matching accuracy,
it is necessary to understand the contribution of each of these individual modules
to the performance. In particular, through our analysis, we wish to understand how
different multimedia are mapped into features, how distortion of the multimedia
changes the feature values extracted, how these changes in the features affect the
final fingerprint, and how these distortions of the fingerprint in turn impact the
matching and the overall identification accuracy.
In the subsequent sections and chapters, we describe the analysis of some
modules used in fingerprinting algorithms under this framework. We first examine
different aspects of the mapping of the features to fingerprint bits in the remainder
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of this chapter. In Section 2.3 we examine the minimum amount of distortion
that an attacker needs to introduce into the features to change a certain number
of fingerprint bits, and in Section 2.4, we examine how the quantizer should be
designed to improve the overall identification accuracy. Section 2.5 sheds light on
the optimal choice of the fingerprint distribution to resist attacks. Chapters 3-5 are
devoted to analyzing the matching performance at the binary fingerprint stage.
2.3 Distortion in Features Reflected in the Fingerprints
In this section, we study how distortion in the features translate into changes
in the fingerprint bits. First, we study the probability of a fingerprint bit changing
when the features are distorted, and examine the influence of the variance of the
distortion and the correlation between the features and distortion on this probability.
We then determine the minimum amount of distortion required to cause a unit
change in the fingerprint, and the influence of the fingerprint distribution on this
quantity.
2.3.1 Problem Setup
In many fingerprint constructions, the final binary fingerprint is obtained by
comparing each feature component to a threshold. For example, in [30], the signs of
differences between the average energy of adjacent frequency bands across frames are
used as fingerprints. Similarly, in schemes employing random projection as the final
step, such as [26, 68], the projection of the feature on a random vector is compared
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to a threshold. We adopt a similar model for our analysis of the fingerprints, where
a set of features are extracted from a multimedia document such as image/video and
are then quantized to 1-bit accuracy by comparing with a threshold. The feature
used could be average block luminance, differences between average block luminance
of adjacent blocks, or functions of transform coefficients.
Suppose that L featuresX1, X2, . . . , XL are extracted from a given multimedia.
For simplicity, we assume that the features can be modeled as i.i.d. random variables
with a common p.d.f. f and corresponding c.d.f. F . Let the ith bit of the fingerprint
Bi ∈ {0, 1} be obtained by comparing the ith feature value to a threshold τ , Bi =
Q(Xi) = U(Xi − τ), where U(·) is the unit step function. Typically, the threshold
is set to be equal to the median value of the distribution f , so that the resulting
bits are equally likely to take the values 0 and 1 [26]. Henceforth, without loss of
generality, we assume that the features have been centered so that the median is
equal to 0 and that the threshold is chosen to be equal to the median, so that τ = 0.
2.3.2 Probability of Flipping a Fingerprint Bit
In this subsection, we examine how distortions of the multimedia are reflected
as changes in the binary fingerprint in terms of the probability of a bit being flipped.
Due to distortions of the underlying signal, the features extracted from a query may
be different from the original features {Xi}. Denote the features obtained from the
distorted content by Xi+Zi, where {Zi} is the distortion in the features. In general,
the distortion Zi may be correlated with the original feature Xi. We assume that
16
the noise in each feature Zi is independent of the remaining {Xj}j 6=i and {Zj}j 6=i.
The probability of a fingerprint bit flipping may be written as:
p = Pr(B′i 6= Bi) = Pr(Xi > 0, Xi + Zi < 0) + Pr(Xi < 0, Xi + Zi > 0), (2.1)
where B′i = Q(Xi+Zi) is the ith fingerprint bit obtained from the distorted content.
For many distributions of interest, the probability in Eqn. (2.1) can be evaluated
numerically. As an example, we consider the case of Gaussian distributed features
and distortion. The inferences obtained from this example would apply similarly to
the case of other distributions.
Suppose that [Xi Zi]


























where for convenience we have normalized the mean and variance of the feature Xi




fX(x) Pr(Zi < −Xi|X = x) dx+
∫
x<0







fX(x)(1− Φ(−x;µz|x, σ2z|x)) dx,
where Φ(x;µ, σ2) is the c.d.f. of a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2, and the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of Zi|X = x are given
by:





The probability p can then be evaluated numerically. Figure 2.2 examines the influ-
ence of the noise power σ2n and the correlation ρ on the probability of a bit flipping,
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Figure 2.2: Relation between the distortion in features and the probability of a
fingerprint bit changing.
when µz = 0. From Figure 2.2(a), we observe that for a fixed correlation, as the
distortion power increases, the probability of a bit flipping increases, as expected.
Figure 2.2(b) indicates that a negatively correlated distortion has a higher proba-
bility of altering a fingerprint bit.
2.3.3 Minimum Distortion Required to Alter Fingerprint
Bits
The probability of a bit flipping for a given type of distortion as evaluated
above is useful for modeling benign processing and gives a sense of the average
distortion needed to change a certain fraction of the fingerprint bits. However, a
malicious adversary seeking to evade detection could distort the features in a smart
manner to cause large changes in the fingerprint while minimizing the amount of dis-
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tortion introduced. The minimum amount of distortion that needs to be introduced
to change fingerprint bits is thus an indicator of the robustness of the feature against
malicious adversaries. We now derive an analytical expression for this metric.
The fingerprint bit obtained by quantizing a given feature Xi can be altered
by adding a value −Xi to it, so that the amount of squared distortion introduced
is |Xi|2. Given L features, m bits of the fingerprint can be changed with mini-
mum distortion by altering the m features with the smallest absolute values. Let
Yi = |Xi| and Y(1), Y(2), . . . , Y(L) denote the order statistics of {Yi}, where Y(1) cor-
responds to the minimum value and Y(L) corresponds to the maximum value. To
change m fingerprint bits, it is sufficient to modify the features corresponding to
Y(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , m and change their sign. The mean squared distortion D
′
L(m) thus








Let p = m
L
denote the fraction of fingerprint bits changed, and DL(p) denote





DL(p) represents the best tradeoff, from an attacker’s perspective, between the
amount of distortion introduced and the changes in the fingerprint. In this sense,
DL(p) is similar to the rate-distortion function in information theory [16].
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2.3.4 Evaluation of the Distortion Function































where E[Y(i)] and Var(Y(i)) represent the mean and variance of the order statistics.











D−→ denotes convergence in distribution and F−1(·) denotes the inverse
c.d.f. [20]. The convergence to the Gaussian distribution, combined with the fact
that the variance reduces to 0 as L increases, implies that the ⌈Lp⌉th order statistic
converges in probability to the mean, X(⌈Lp⌉)
P−→ F−1(p).










































as the variance term decays to zero for large L. Define mi =
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dm = D(p), (2.3)
for large L, where F−1Y (·) corresponds to the inverse c.d.f. of the absolute value of the
features. Using the above expression, the distortion function can be evaluated for
any distribution for which the inverse c.d.f. can be computed efficiently. Further, we
observe that the the number of features L does not appear in the above expression.
This implies that the minimum expected mean squared distortion needed to alter a
fixed fraction of the fingerprint bits is independent of the number of bits.
2.3.5 Numerical Results
To verify our theoretical derivations, we perform experiments with synthetic
data. We generate random variables with a specified distribution, alter the signs of
Lp features with the minimum absolute values, and compute the average distortion
introduced to estimate D(p).
Figure 2.3 shows the distortion function for the case when the features {Xi}
extracted from the image/video are distributed as standard Gaussian random vari-
ables. From the figure, we observe that for L ≥ 64, the distortion function is
independent of the number of features. The difference between the distortion func-
tion for L = 16 and for larger L is small, especially in the region of interest, where
p < 0.5. Further, to completely change the fingerprint, the mean squared distor-
tion introduced is equal to the variance of the features. This is due to the fact
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Figure 2.3: Influence of the number of features N on the distortion function.
that to change every single fingerprint bit, the distortion needed will be equal to
the negative of the features. As a result, the average distortion introduced will be
equal to the variance of the feature. We next compare the simulation results with
the analytical expression in Eqn. (2.3), which is evaluated by numerical integration.
Figure 2.4 shows that the theoretical expression and the simulation results agree
very well.
2.3.6 Influence of Different Feature Distributions
We next consider the effect of the distribution of the features on the distortion
function. As indicated by Eqn. (2.3), the inverse c.d.f. of the absolute value of the
feature determines the distortion function. We consider three commonly encoun-
tered distributions for image features - uniform, Laplacian, and Gaussian. To enable
a fair comparison, we normalize the variance of the distributions.




] with ∆ =
√
12 has unit variance. The
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of the distortion function obtained via theory and simu-
lation.






, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. The distortion function for the uniform distribution














), the variance is
given by σ2L = 2b




. The c.d.f. of the corresponding
Yi = |Xi| is then given by F (L)Y (y) = 1−exp(−yb ), y ≥ 0 and the corresponding inverse
c.d.f. is F
−1 (L)
Y (y) = −b ln(1 − y), 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Integrating the square of the inverse
c.d.f. to obtain the distortion function gives
D(L)(p) = 0.5[2p− (1− p)((ln(1− p))2 − 2 ln(p))]
where we have used the fact that 2b2 = 1. For the Gaussian distribution, no closed
form expression exists for the inverse c.d.f, and we use numerical techniques to
23




































Figure 2.5: Influence of the feature distribution on the distortion function. (b)
displays an enlarged portion of the distortion function to highlight the region 0 <
p < 0.5.
compute the distortion function.
Figure 2.5(a) shows the distortion function for random variables with the uni-
form, Gaussian, and Laplacian densities and Figure 2.5(b) shows an enlarged portion
of the distortion function in the region of practical interest. From these figures, we
observe that the uniform distribution requires the highest distortion to change the
fingerprint by a fixed fraction, followed by the Gaussian distribution. The Laplacian
distribution requires the least amount of distortion to be introduced. These results
can be explained by examining the inverse c.d.f. of the absolute value F−1Y (y), shown
in Figure 2.6. We observe that for small y, the inverse c.d.f. corresponding to uni-
form distributed random variables has the highest value compared to the Gaussian
and Laplacian distributions, which results in a corresponding highest value for the
distortion function. Intuitively, since the Gaussian and Laplacian distributions are
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of the inverse c.d.f. of the absolute value for different
distributions.
more likely to produce values closer to 0, the average amount of distortion needed
to change these values is lower, compared to the uniform distribution. Thus, a dis-
tribution that is more spread out, or has lesser probability mass close to 0, would
give a better performance from this viewpoint. In terms of the kurtosis, which is a
measure of the “peakedness” of a distribution, having a lower value for the kurtosis
implies that the distribution is more robust under this metric. If a designer has
an option to choose between features with different distributions, then this metric
could be used as a guideline for choosing a robust feature.
2.4 Optimal Quantizer Design for Content Identification
As described in Section 2.2, features extracted from multimedia are often quan-
tized and encoded to obtain compact fingerprints, which require lesser storage. The
quantization can also serve to improve the robustness against noise, but should
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be designed carefully to preserve the discriminative ability of the features. 1-bit
quantizers are commonly used in fingerprinting applications [30]. Another common
quantization and encoding technique is ordinal ranking [60], which has been studied
and analyzed in [13, 14].
The problem of designing quantizers to optimize various criteria has been
studied in the literature in different contexts. Quantizing and reconstructing a signal
to achieve the minimum mean squared reconstruction error was studied in [51]. The
optimal quantizer for this problem is the well known Lloyd-Max quantizer [36, 51].
Vector quantization techniques with applications in signal compression have also
been studied in the literature [28]. Quantizer design for encoding a signal in noise
to achieve minimum reconstruction error with respect to the noiseless source was
studied in [2]. Quantizer design in a joint source channel coding framework was
considered in [24]. In this setting, a source signal is quantized, and the binary
codeword representing the quantized signal is transmitted over a binary symmetric
channel. The decoder uses the channel output to reconstruct the source signal. The
goal is to design a quantizer that minimizes the mean squared error between the
source and the reconstructed signal.
As we will show below, quantizer design for content identification shares some
similarities with the joint source channel coding problem considered in [24]. How-
ever, the main difference is that in [24] the binary encoded signal is transmitted
over the noisy channel, whereas in the fingerprinting problem, the original signal
is itself transmitted over a channel, which induces a noisy channel between the









Figure 2.7: Quantizer design for content identification.
2.4.1 Problem Description
The problem setup for quantizer design in identification applications is shown
in Figure 2.7. A source X is quantized using a scalar quantizer QX(·), to obtain
Z = QX(X). The random variable X may correspond to features derived from
images or video in content identification applications or may correspond to features
derived from biometric data in biometric identification applications. The quantized
value Z which corresponds to the fingerprint is then stored in the database. In
the identification stage, a noisy version of X denoted by Y is observed. To com-
pute the fingerprint W , the feature Y is quantized using a quantizer QY (·) so that
W = QY (Y ). The quantizers QX and QY have LX and LY reconstruction values
respectively. The objective is to choose the quantization thresholds of QX and QY
so as to achieve the best identification performance.
The performance of an identification system is typically measured in terms
of the probabilities of false alarm and correct identification. However, closed form
expressions for these quantities in terms of the distributions of X and Y cannot be
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easily obtained. Instead, we use the identification capacity Cid [101] as a measure of
the identification performance. The identification capacity for the system described
in Figure 2.7 is given by Cid = I(Z;W ), where I(Z;W ) is the mutual information
between the random variables Z and W [101]. The identification capacity is an
important parameter, as the maximum number of distinct fingerprints that can be
identified Nmax is related to the capacity Cid as Nmax ≈ 2LCid, where L is the length
of the fingerprint.
Let −∞ = t0 < t1 < . . . < tLX =∞ be the quantization thresholds of QX and
−∞ = t′0 < t′1 < . . . < t′LY = ∞ be the thresholds of QY . The problem can now
be stated as: Given the distribution of X ∼ pX(x) and the conditional distribution
of Y |X ∼ pY |X(y|x), choose the values {ti}LX−1i=1 and {t′j}LY −1j=1 so as to maximize
the mutual information I(Z;W ). Note that as the mutual information depends on
the joint probability distribution of Z and W and not on the actual values of the
random variables, the reconstruction points of the quantizer need not be considered
in the optimization problem.
2.4.2 Necessary Condition for Optimality
In this section, we derive a necessary condition for optimality by setting the
first derivative of the objective function to zero. For convenience, denote the recon-
struction points of QX and QY by {ri}LXi=1 and {r′j}LYj=1, respectively, so that
QX(x) = ri if x ∈ (ti−1, ti].
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At the optimal solution, the derivative of the objective function should be zero.
Setting ∂
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where we have assumed that pX(ti) 6= 0 and pY (t′j) 6= 0, Eqns. (2.4) and (2.5)
give LX + LY − 2 simultaneous nonlinear equations in LX + LY − 2 variables. Un-
fortunately, these equations cannot be solved analytically to obtain closed form
expressions for the optimal solution. As an alternative, in the next section, we
propose an iterative algorithm for determining the quantizer thresholds.
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2.4.3 Iterative Algorithm
In many quantizer design problems, it is often not possible to analytically solve
for the optimum thresholds and reconstruction values, and iterative algorithms are
used instead. The Lloyd-Max algorithm for designing quantizers with minimum
mean-square reconstruction error [51] is a classical example of such an iterative
algorithm. This algorithm alternates between optimizing the quantizer thresholds
and the reconstruction points at each iteration. We adopt a similar approach to
iteratively optimize the quantizer thresholds.
The thresholds {ti} and {t′j} are randomly initialized. At each step of the
iteration, the algorithm alternates between estimating the optimal values for {ti}
and {t′j} assuming that the other set of values is fixed. For example, first, the
thresholds {ti} for the QX quantizer are fixed and the values of {t′j} that maximize
the objective function I(Z;W ) are found numerically. Subsequently, these {t′j}
values are kept constant and the optimal values of {ti} are determined. This process
is repeated until the value of the objective function does not change significantly
with each iteration. As the value of the objective function is non-decreasing in each
step of the iteration, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local minimum.
Convergence to the global minimum is typically not guaranteed in many quantizer
design problems such as [51], due to the multi-dimensional optimization and the
non-convex objective function which may have several local minima.
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2.4.4 Results
In this subsection, we present experimental results using i.i.d. Gaussian signals
as an example. The original feature components are assumed to be i.i.d. N (0, 1),
and the noise components are assumed to have components that are i.i.d. N (0, σ2n).
The iterative algorithm described in the previous subsection is used to design the
quantizers to maximize the mutual information between the original and noisy fin-
gerprints. As a baseline for comparison, the Lloyd-Max quantizer which is the
optimal MMSE quantizer is used to obtain the quantization thresholds for QX(·)
and QY (·).
The number of quantizer levels is set to 4 in both cases, LX = LY = 4, so that
three thresholds need to be determined for each of the quantizers. As the distribution
is symmetric about zero, the second threshold obtained by both algorithms turns out
to be zero, so that the quantizers are mid-rise. Further, the first and third thresholds
are negatives of each other, implying that the quantizers can be characterized by one
parameter, say, the value of the third threshold. Figure 2.8 compares the thresholds
determined by the Lloyd-Max algorithm and the proposed method for QX and QY .
We observe that when the value for the noise is small, each algorithm chooses similar
values for the threshold of QX and QY . This is due to the fact that when the noise
is small, the distribution of the noisy features Y is similar to the distribution of the
original featuresX . We also observe that as the noise power increases, the thresholds
chosen by both algorithms for QY becomes similar, as the noise distribution tends to
dominate. For intermediate values, we observe that the proposed algorithm chooses
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of the quantization thresholds obtained by the proposed
method and the Lloyd Max algorithm.
thresholds that are somewhat smaller than the corresponding ones for the Lloyd-
Max quantizer.
Figure 2.9 compares the identification accuracy in terms of the receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) curves, where we plot the probability of correctly iden-
tifying a query Pc as a function of the probability of false alarm Pf on a semi-log
scale, when the noise standard deviation σn = 0.5. We also compare the accuracy
achievable using two different detectors. The optimal Maximum Likelihood (ML)
detector utilizes the knowledge of the joint p.m.f. of the quantized original and
noisy features to compute the likelihood and compares it to a threshold. In practi-
cal applications, this joint p.m.f. may not be available and it may be simpler to use
the minimum distance detector instead. The minimum distance detector finds the




























Figure 2.9: Comparison of the identification accuracy using the ML and mini-
mum distance detector using features quantized by the proposed and Lloyd-Max
algorithms.
a threshold. In our simulations, we use the L1 distance as the distance metric. From
the figure, we observe that using the ML detector in conjunction with the quantizer
from the proposed algorithm gives the best performance. When the minimum dis-
tance detector is used instead, the Pc reduces, but is still better than the accuracy
achievable using the Lloyd-Max quantizer. We observe that features quantized using
the proposed algorithm yield consistently higher performance, especially at low Pf .
For example, when Pf = 10
−3, fingerprints obtained using the proposed algorithm
yield 10− 15% higher Pc compared to the Lloyd-Max quantizer.
As the proposed quantizer design algorithm utilizes the knowledge of the noise
distribution, it is interesting to examine how changes in the noise parameters would




































Figure 2.10: Generalization capabilities of the quantizers.
tizer, we perform the following experiment. The quantizers are designed assuming
that the noise standard deviation is σn = 0.25 and the resulting quantizers are
used to encode the features and obtain the fingerprints. Subsequently, noise with
standard deviation σn = 0.25 and 0.5 is added to the features and these noisy fea-
tures are quantized to obtain the distorted fingerprints. The identification accuracy
when the distorted fingerprints are used as queries is shown in Figure 2.10. We ob-
serve that for features quantized using both the quantizers, the performance reduces
when σn = 0.5 compared to when σn = 0.25 due to the stronger noise. However,
the fingerprints obtained using the proposed method lead to a higher accuracy. For




2.5 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Content Fingerprinting
In Section 2.3, we examined the relation between the feature distribution and
the amount of distortion needed to change a given fraction of the fingerprint bits.
In this section, we study the optimal choice for the distribution of the fingerprint
bits from the system designer’s perspective, in the presence of such distortion that
may be introduced by adversaries.
In the content identification problem, the system designer and the adversary
modifying the content have conflicting objectives. The adversary’s goal is to upload
content and avoid detection, while the designer’s goal is to identify modified content
and minimize the probability of misclassification and false alarm. These conflicting
objectives can be modeled under the framework of game theory [65]. In this section,
we model the dynamics between the designer and the adversary by a two-player game
between the adversary A and the system designer D. In this game, the designer D
designs the fingerprinting scheme and the adversary chooses the attack, to maximize
their respective payoff functions. We illustrate this model using the example of
binary fingerprints, which are commonly used for content identification [3, 15, 30].
We focus on the design and possible attacks on the fingerprints at the binary level.




In the content identification game using binary fingerprinting, the strategy
space of the designer consists of possible choices for the distribution of the fingerprint
bits. For simplicity, here we consider fingerprint bits that are i.i.d. Under this
setting, the designer chooses a value 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 0.5 as the probability that a fingerprint
bit is 0 and q1 = 1 − q0 is the probability that a bit is 1. Thus, the strategy space
for the designer SD is the interval [0, 0.5].
The strategy space for the adversary consists of possible modifications of the
content that do not introduce excessive distortion and render the content unusable.
Denote the probability of a fingerprint bit 0 being changed to a 1 after modification of
the video by p01 and the probability that a bit 1 changes to 0 by p10. As the adversary
chooses these parameters, his strategy space is given by SA = 0 ≤ p01, p10 ≤ 1.
2.5.2 Payoff functions
Designer’s Payoff Function
At the detection stage, for each content V(i) in the database, the detector
has to decide whether the query content denoted by Z is a distorted version of
V(i), by comparing their fingerprints. Let X(i) and Y be the fingerprints of V(i)
and Z, respectively. If Z is indeed a modified version of V(i), then the fingerprints
X(i) and Y are dependent and their joint distribution is p(Y|X(i))q(X(i)), where
q(·) is the marginal distribution of the fingerprints and p(Y|X(i)) is the conditional
distribution representing the modification. If Z is not a modified version of V(i),
36
then the fingerprints X(i) and Y are independent and their joint distribution is
q(Y)q(X(i)).
The identification system’s performance can be characterized by the probabil-
ity Pf of incorrectly deciding that X
(i) and Y are dependent when they are actually
independent, which corresponds to a false alarm, and the probability Pm of deciding
that X(i) and Y are independent when they are actually dependent which corre-
sponds to a missed detection. As the designer’s objective is to achieve low values
for Pf and Pm, a suitable function of these quantities can be chosen as the payoff for
the designer. However, as in any detection problem, these error probabilities are not
independent of each other. In many practical applications, it is common to fix one
of these error probabilities, say Pf , to be less than a threshold α and then minimize
the other type of error. From the Chernoff-Stein Lemma [16], we know that the best
asymptotic error exponent that can be achieved under this setting is given by the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the distributions under the two hypotheses
D(p(Y|X(i))q(X(i))||q(Y)q(X(i))). As the fingerprint bits are i.i.d., the KL distance
between the distributions is LDKL, where DKL = D(p(y|x)q(x)||q(y)q(x)), p(·|·) is
the conditional distribution representing the modification of one bit and q(·) is the
common distribution of the individual fingerprint bits. By choosing q0 appropriately
to maximize the KL distance, the designer can reduce the probability of making an
error. Thus, we choose the KL distance between the two distributions as the payoff
(utility) function for the designer UD(q0, p) = DKL = D(p(y|x)q(x)||q(y)q(x)).
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Adversary’s Payoff Function
The adversary’s main goal is to evade detection while minimizing the amount
of distortion introduced into the content. By choosing the parameters p01 and p10
to minimize the KL distance DKL between the two distributions, the adversary can
reduce the probability of being detected. Hence, we choose −DKL as the adversary’s
payoff function. We also add a penalty term to the adversary’s payoff based on the
amount of distortion introduced into the video, to incorporate the adversary’s goal
of minimizing the perceptual distortion. We assume that the distortion of the origi-
nal video can be equivalently represented in terms of the change in the fingerprint of
the video, as analyzed in Section 2.3. For simplicity, we assume that the perceived
commercial value of the distorted content reduces as a linear function of the Ham-
ming distance between the fingerprints of the original and modified content. The
analysis can be performed similarly for other models relating the distortion to the
reduction in commercial value.
Under this setting, the expected utility for the adversary can be given as
UA(q0, p) = −DKL− cd 1LE[dH(X(i),Y)], where E[dH(X(i),Y)] is the expected Ham-
ming distance between the fingerprint X(i) of the original content and the finger-
print Y of the distorted content, and cd is the rate at which the perceived value
of the content reduces as a function of the average Hamming distance. Since




(i),Y)] = q0p01 + q1p10 and the expected payoff for the adversary is given
by UA(q0, p) = −DKL − cd(q0p01 + q1p10). We see that the adversary can reduce
38
the probability of being detected by reducing DKL, but this would increase the dis-
tortion and hence reduce the value of the content. The adversary has to find the
optimal tradeoff between these conflicting objectives.
2.5.3 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
We recognize that under the above settings, the game corresponds to a two
player sequential game with perfect recall [65]. In such sequential games, the optimal
strategies for the players are given by Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The
SPNE are similar to saddle-points and correspond to strategies from which neither
player has incentive to deviate, given that the other player plays his equilibrium
strategy. In other words, given that the designer plays his part of the equilibrium
solution, the adversary cannot obtain a higher payoff by playing any strategy other
than his equilibrium strategy, and vice versa. The SPNE of this game are given by
points (q∗0, p
∗(q∗0)), such that
p∗(q0) = arg max
0≤(p01,p10)≤1
UA(q0, p)




These equations indicate that for each q0 chosen by the designer, the attacker chooses
the strategy that maximizes his/her payoff function, called the best response strat-
egy. The designer chooses the strategy that maximizes his/her payoff given that the
attacker chooses the best response strategy.
The maximum expected payoff that the adversary can achieve, given that the
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Figure 2.11: Adversary’s best response strategy: Optimum choices of (a) p01 and
(b) p10 as a function of the system designer’s choice of q0.
designer chooses q0 is given by
U∗A(q0) = max
0≤p01,p10≤1
−DKL − cd(q0p01 + q1p10).
As −DKL is concave in p [16], the utility function UA is concave in p. As the









. Using the above values for p∗01 and
p∗10, the maximum value of the expected utility for the adversary is found to be
U∗A(q0) = q0 log2(q0 + q12
−cd) + q1 log2(q1 + q02
−cd).
Figure 2.11 shows the optimal values for p01 and p10 as a function of q0 for
various values of the degradation parameter cd. We observe that when cd is small,
e.g. cd = 0.1, which implies that the value of the distorted content reduces slowly
as a function of the distortion introduced, the adversary can choose large values for
p01 and p10, corresponding to making large changes to the content so as to evade
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Figure 2.12: Maximum payoffs for the players: (a) Maximum payoff for adversary
as a function of q0. (b) Designer’s payoff when the adversary plays his best strategy.
detection, without incurring a significant reduction in the commercial value. If the
parameter cd is large, e.g. cd = 10, the adversary cannot introduce much distortion
into the content, as the value reduces rapidly and is restricted to modifications that
result in a very small fraction of the fingerprints bits being altered. The maximum
payoff that the adversary can obtain by playing his optimal strategy, in response to
the designer’s choice of q0 is shown in Figure 2.12(a). For any fixed value of q0, the
adversary obtains a higher payoff when cd is small, as he can introduce distortion
without reducing the value of the content significantly.
When the adversary plays his best response strategy p∗(q0) shown in Fig-
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ure 2.11, the payoff for the designer is found to be
UD(q0, p
∗(q0)) = −q0 log2(q0 + q12−cd)
−q1 log2(q1 + q02−cd)
−cdq0q1
1 + 2−cd
(q0 + q12−cd)(q1 + q02−cd)
,
and is shown in Figure 2.12(b). We observe that when cd increases, the designer can
obtain a higher payoff, as the adversary can make limited changes to the content.
This indicates that the fingerprint algorithm should be designed carefully, so that
it is not easy to alter fingerprint bits without causing a lot of distortion. From the
figure, we also see that for a fixed cd, the payoff for the designer is an increasing
function of q0, attaining a maximum at q0 = 0.5. Thus, the optimal strategy for the
designer is to choose the fingerprint bits to be 0 or 1 with equal probability, while
the corresponding best strategy for the adversary is p01 = p10 =
1
1+2cd
. If 2cd ≫ 1,
p01 = p10 ≈ 2−cd indicating that the optimal choice for the adversary is to modify
a very small fraction of the bits. If 2cd ≪ 1, then p01 = p10 ≈ 1 signifying that the
adversary can cause large changes to the hash and easily evade detection.
2.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we described a framework for analyzing content fingerprinting
by developing models for the various commonly used modules. By such an analysis
we can gain understanding of how different types of multimedia processing affects
the fingerprints and how such changes in turn affect the identification performance.
Under this framework, we studied how distortion of the features affects the
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fingerprint bits extracted from the features. We derived a closed form expression for
the minimum amount of distortion needed to change a certain fraction of bits. Our
analysis showed that to change a fixed fraction of bits, the minimum mean squared
distortion needed is independent of the number of features or equivalently, the length
of the fingerprint. We also studied the influence of the feature distribution on this
metric and found that distributions that produce values close to zero with higher
probability or have high kurtosis, are not favorable from the designer’s perspective.
We next studied the design of a quantizer for use in fingerprint schemes to
achieve the best identification performance. We derived sufficient conditions for
the optimality of the quantizer, and proposed an iterative algorithm to determine
the quantization thresholds. Through experiments, we showed that the proposed
quantizer can improve the identification performance by around 10% at low Pf
values.
We also modeled the dynamics of the interaction between the fingerprint sys-
tem designer and an adversary seeking to evade detection under the framework of
game theory. Using the example of binary fingerprint-based content identification,
we illustrated the model and obtained strategies for designing the fingerprints to
achieve the best possible performance. We showed that the optimal strategy for the
system designer is to design the fingerprinting scheme such that the resultant bits
are equally likely to take values 0 and 1 and also highlighted the benefit of designing
robust schemes such that the content has to be distorted significantly in order to
cause changes to the fingerprint.
Having gained some understanding of different modules involved in translat-
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ing video features to fingerprint bits, in the next three chapters, we focus on the
modeling and analysis of fingerprints in the bit domain. Chapter 3 examines the
best possible identification accuracy achievable using binary i.i.d. fingerprints. In
Chapter 4 we refine this model to allow correlations among the fingerprints and ex-
amine their performance. We examine the impact of correlations among fingerprints
extracted from successive temporal frames in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of Binary Fingerprints
with i.i.d. Components
As discussed in the previous chapter, theoretical analysis of content fingerprint-
ing approaches can provide insights into the performance of various algorithms, and
enable us to predict how the performance would scale as system parameters, such
as the size of the database, increase. In this chapter, we first describe a hypothe-
sis testing framework for evaluating content fingerprinting schemes in Section 3.1.
Subsequently, in Section 3.2 we focus on binary fingerprints with i.i.d. bits and
derive expressions for the probability of correctly identifying the content. We then
use these expressions to derive bounds on the error probabilities in Section 3.3 and
examine how these probabilities depend on factors such the fingerprint length and
the size of the database. A lower bound on the fingerprint length needed to achieve a
desired identification performance is obtained. This analysis also uncovers relations
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between video fingerprinting and the problem of decoding with errors and erasures.
In Section 3.4, we validate our theoretical predictions using an image database and
a simple fingerprinting scheme.
3.1 Hypothesis Testing Framework
Hypothesis testing has been commonly used to model identification and clas-
sification problems [67] and a similar framework is adopted in this dissertation for
analyzing content identification. To establish the notation that will be used in this
and the subsequent chapters, we summarize the hypothesis testing framework in
this subsection. For ease of presentation, we describe the framework using the ex-
ample of a video identification application, but the analysis and results apply to
other identification tasks as well.
The system model for a fingerprint-based video identification scheme is shown
in Figure 3.1. Suppose that the detector has a collection ofN videosV(1),V(2), . . . ,V(N)
which would serve as a reference database for identifying query videos. For exam-
ple, in a UGC website application, the videos {V(i)} may correspond to copyrighted
videos that should be identified and filtered. In the initial creation stage, compact
fingerprints {X(i)} corresponding to the videos {V(i)} are computed and stored in
the database as shown in Figure 3.1(a). Note that the dimension of the fingerprint
X(i) is usually much smaller than the dimensionality of the video V(i).
Given a query video Z that needs to be identified, the detector computes the




























Figure 3.1: System Model
in its database, which are available at the detector. In general, the query Z may be
some video W that does not correspond to any video in the database or a possibly
distorted version of some video V(i) in the database. These distortions may be
caused by incidental changes that occur during transmission and storage, such as
compression and transcoding, or they may be intentional distortions introduced by
an attacker to prevent the identification of the content.
We consider two different detection objectives based on the requirements of
different applications. In some applications, such as a video sharing website imple-
menting content filtering, it may be sufficient to determine if the content is subject
to copyright protection or not. In this case, the detector is only interested in de-
termining whether a given video is present in a database of copyrighted material or
not. We refer to this scenario as the detection problem, which can be formulated as
47
a binary hypothesis test:
H0 : Z does not correspond to any video in {V(1),V(2), . . . ,V(N)},
H1 : Z corresponds to some video in {V(1),V(2), . . . ,V(N)}. (3.1)
Under this setting, the performance of a particular fingerprinting scheme with the
associated decision rule δD(·) can be evaluated using the probability of false alarm
Pf = Pr(δD = 1|H0) and the probability of correct detection Pd = Pr(δD = 1|H1)
or equivalently, the probability of missed detection Pm = 1− Pd.
In some applications, such as automatic tagging of content, the detector is
further interested in identifying the original video corresponding to a query video.
We refer to this scenario as the identification problem, which can be modeled as a
multiple hypothesis test with each hypothesis corresponding to one original video
and a null hypothesis corresponding to the case that the uploaded video is not
present in the database:
H0 : Z is not from the database {V(1),V(2), . . . ,V(N)},
Hi : Z is a (possibly distorted) version of V
(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (3.2)
In this scenario, the probability of correctly identifying a query video Pc, the proba-
bility of misclassifying a video Pmc, and the probability of false alarm Pf can be used
to quantify the performance of a given fingerprinting scheme and the corresponding
detector δI(·). In the remainder of this chapter, we examine the performance of i.i.d.
binary fingerprinting schemes under this hypothesis testing framework.
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3.2 Fingerprints with Independent Bits
Binary strings are commonly employed in fingerprinting schemes such as [30,
64] since comparison of binary strings can be performed efficiently. From the de-
signer’s point of view, it is desirable for the fingerprint bits to be independent of
each other, so that an attacker cannot alter a significant number of fingerprint bits
at once by making minor changes to the content. Further, if the bits are equally
likely to be 0 or 1, the overall entropy is maximized and each bit conveys the max-
imum amount of information. If the bits are not equally likely to be 0 or 1, they
can be compressed into a shorter vector with equiprobable bits, in order to meet
the compactness requirement of the fingerprint. As shown in Section 2.5, from a
game-theoretic perspective also, using equally likely bits is advantageous for the
designer [90]. Binary strings with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
bits also arise in biometric identification [94]. Hence, in this chapter, we focus on
the performance of fingerprinting schemes with i.i.d. equally likely bits and assume
that each fingerprint X(i) consists of L bits that are distributed i.i.d. according
to a Bernoulli(0.5) distribution. Binary fingerprints with correlated bits will be
examined in Chapter 4.
Distortions introduced into the content translate into changes in the fingerprint
of the content. By a suitable choice of features used for constructing the fingerprint
and appropriate preprocessing and synchronization, such attacks can be modeled
as additive noise n in the hash space [56]. Since the hash bits considered in this
section are designed to be i.i.d., we model the effect of attacks on the multimedia
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content as altering each bit of the hash independently with probability p < 0.5, i.e.
the components of n are i.i.d. Bernoulli(p). The maximum possible value of p is
proportional to the maximum amount of distortion that may be introduced into the
multimedia content and will be referred to as the distortion parameter.
3.2.1 Detection Problem
Under the assumptions outlined above, the detection problem, where the detec-
tor is only interested in identifying whether a given content is present in a database
or not, becomes:
H0 : Y 6= X(i) + n for i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
H1 : Y = X
(i) + n, for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (3.3)
where Y, X(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N and the noise n are all binary vectors of length
L. Under hypothesis H0, Y can take any value with equal probability, since the
fingerprint bits are i.i.d. with equal probability of being 0 or 1, so that Pr(Y =
y|H0) = 12L , ∀y ∈ {0, 1}L. The distribution of the fingerprint Y, given that it is a
modified version of X(i), Pr(Y|X(i)) can be specified by considering their Hamming
distance. Let di = d(Y,X
(i)) be the Hamming distance between the fingerprint of
the query video and a given fingerprint X(i) in the database. Since the probability
of a bit being altered due to the noise is p, the probability that exactly di bits are
altered is Pr(Y|X(i)) = pdi(1− p)L−di.
The alternative hypothesis H1 is thus a composite hypothesis, as the computed
fingerprintY can have different distributions depending on which original fingerprint
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> τ ′′ (3.4)
where the threshold τ ′′ can be chosen to satisfy some optimality criterion. If the pri-
ors of the hypotheses and the associated costs are known, then τ ′′ can be computed
so as to minimize the expected Bayes risk. If the costs are known, but the priors are
unknown, the threshold τ ′′ can be chosen to minimize the maximum expected risk.
We use a Neyman-Pearson approach [67] to maximize the probability of detection
Pd subject to the constraint that the probability of false alarm Pf ≤ α.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that all videos in the database are equally
likely to correspond to a query. In situations where some popular videos may be
queried more often than others, the analysis can be applied by appropriately mod-


















> τ ′ (3.5)
where the constants have been absorbed into the threshold τ ′. We note that the left
hand side is a sum of exponentials, and for a reasonably large L, only the largest
term would be relevant. Further, since px(1− p)1−x is a decreasing function of x for
p < 0.5, the largest term in the left hand side of Eqn. (3.5) would be the one with
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1 if dmin < τ,
1 with probability q if dmin = τ ,
0 otherwise,
(3.6)
where dmin = mini=1,2,...,N
di. Here τ is an integer threshold expressed in terms of the
Hamming distance, and τ and q are chosen to achieve a desired probability of false
alarm α. Based on this decision rule, the query is detected as being present in the
database (δD = 1), if the minimum Hamming distance between the fingerprint of
the query and the fingerprints in the database is less than a specified threshold τ .
Computing Pd and Pf
The probability of false alarm Pf for a threshold τ is given by Pf(τ) =
Pr(dmin < τ |H0) + qPr(dmin = τ |H0). To compute the value of Pf (τ), consider the
Hamming distance between Y andX(i), which can be expressed as di = d(Y,X
(i)) =
wt(Y ⊕X(i)), where wt(·) denotes the Hamming weight of a binary vector and ⊕
denotes addition over the binary field (XOR). Under H0, since each bit of Y and
X(i) are equally likely to be 0 or 1, each component of Y⊕X(i) is also Bernoulli(0.5).
The probability distribution of di = wt(Y ⊕ X(i)) thus corresponds to the weight
of a random binary vector with i.i.d. uniform entries, which is a binomial distri-
bution with parameters L and 0.5. Denote the probability mass function (p.m.f.)






the tail probability by F0(k) ,
∑L
j=k f0(j). Then Pr(di = k|H0) = f0(k) and
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Pr(di ≥ k|H0) = F0(k).
As the fingerprints X(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N are independent, we have Pr(dmin ≥
τ |H0) =
∏N
i=1 Pr(di ≥ τ |H0) = [F0(τ)]N . The probability of false alarm can now be
written as
Pf(τ) = (1− [F0(τ)]N ) + q([F0(τ)]N − [F0(τ + 1)]N)
= 1− (1− q)[F0(τ)]N − q[F0(τ + 1)]N (3.7)
To compute the probability of detection, denote the p.m.f. of a binomial





pk(1 − p)L−k and the tail
probability by F1(k) ,
∑L
j=k f1(j). The probability of detection is given as Pd(τ) =
Pr(dmin < τ |H1) + qPr(dmin = τ |H1). Suppose that H1 is true and that the query
video is actually a distorted version of video Vs. As the noise is assumed to change
each fingerprint bit independently with probability p, Pr(ds = k|H1, s) = f1(k) and
Pr(ds ≥ τ |H1, s) = F1(k). For i 6= s, since X(i) is independent of Y and has i.i.d.
equally likely bits, Y⊕X(i) has i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.5) components. Thus the distance
di = wt(Y⊕X(i)), i 6= s follows a binomial distribution with parameters L and 0.5,
which is the same as the distribution under H0. Now consider
Pr(dmin ≥ τ |H1, Vs) = Pr(ds ≥ τ |H1, Vs)
∏
i 6=s
Pr(di ≥ τ |H1, Vs)
= F1(τ)[F0(τ)]
N−1.
The probability of detection can then be written as
Pd(τ) = 1− [F1(τ)][F0(τ)]N−1 + q( [F1(τ)][F0(τ)]N−1 − [F1(τ + 1)][F0(τ + 1)]N−1 )
= 1− (1− q)[F1(τ)][F0(τ)]N−1 − q[F1(τ + 1)][F0(τ + 1)]N−1. (3.8)
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(a) N = 230, L = 256 bits










































(b) p = 0.3, L = 256 bits (c) N = 230, p = 0.3




In Figure 3.2, we show the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) computed
using Eqns. (3.7) and (3.8) for various values of the parameters L, N , and p. Fig-
ure 3.2(a) shows the ROC curves as the distortion parameter p is increased from 0.2
to 0.3 for N = 230 fingerprints in the database each of length 256 bits. We observe
that as the distortion parameter p increases, the probability Pd of detecting a copy-
righted video reduces for a given probability of false alarm Pf . As p approaches 0.5,
the probability of detection approaches the lower bound Pd = Pf . Figure 3.2(b) ex-
amines the influence of the number of fingerprints in the database N on the detector
performance for a fixed fingerprint length L = 256 bits and distortion parameter
p = 0.3. As N increases, the probability of false alarm increases. As a result, for a
given Pd, the Pf is higher, or equivalently, for a fixed Pf , the probability of detection
is lower. Figure 3.2(c) shows that under a given distortion, the detector performance
can be improved by using a longer fingerprint. As the fingerprint length is increased,
Pd increases for a given Pf .
3.2.2 Identification Problem
We now consider the identification problem for binary fingerprinting schemes,
where the detector is interested in identifying the specific video that the query
corresponds to. As discussed in Section 3.1, this scenario can be modeled as a
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multiple hypothesis test:
H0 : Y 6= X(i) + n, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
Hi : Y = X
(i) + n, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (3.9)
As before, we assume that the fingerprint bits are i.i.d. and equally likely to
be 0 or 1, the noise independently changes each bit with probability p and that the
prior probability of each hypothesis is the same. Under this model, the Maximum

















where di = d(Y,X
(i)). If fingerprints of several copyrighted videos have the same
distance to the fingerprint of the query video Y, one of them is chosen randomly as
the match.
We now compute the performance metrics for the ML detector δI . The prob-
ability of false alarm Pf is given by
Pf (τ) = Pr(at least one of d1, d2, . . . , dN ≤ τ |H0),
= 1− Pr(none of d1, d2, . . . , dN ≤ τ |H0),
= 1− [F0(τ + 1)]N .
As the fingerprints {X(i)} are identically distributed and equally likely to be queried,
and the distribution of the noise n under each of the hypotheses is the same, the over-
all probability of correct identification Pc will be equal to the probability of correct
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identification under any given hypothesis, for example H1. Under this hypothesis,
d1 has p.m.f. f1 and di, i 6= 1 has p.m.f. f0, so that:
Pc(τ) = Pr(δI = 1|H1)
































Similarly, the probability of misclassification can be computed as:





































Figure 3.3 shows the influence of the various parameters on the identification
accuracy of the ML detector in Eqn. (3.10). Figure 3.3(a) shows the influence of the
distortion parameter p. We observe that as p increases, the probability of correct
identification Pc at a given false alarm probability Pf reduces, and the probability
of misclassification Pmc increases. The influence of the number of videos N on the
accuracy of identification is shown in Figure 3.3(b). As the number of videos in
the database increases, the probability of false alarm increases, or equivalently, at
a given Pf , the value of Pc is lower. Figure 3.3(b) shows that the probability of
correct identification under a given distortion p and a given Pf can be increased
by increasing the hash length. Thus, given the number of videos N and a desired
probability of false alarm Pf , the content identification system can be made more
robust by choosing a longer hash length L. These results are similar to that obtained
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(a) N = 230, L = 256 bits














































(b) p = 0.25, L = 256 bits (c) N = 230, p = 0.25
Figure 3.3: ROC curves for the multiple hypothesis testing problem obtained from
theoretical analysis.
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for the detection problem in the previous section.
3.3 Error Exponents and Performance Bounds
In Section 3.2, we have derived expressions for the probability of correct iden-
tification and false alarm for a given set of parameters and examined the tradeoff
between identification accuracy, robustness and the fingerprint length. In practice,
we are often interested in choosing system parameters to ensure that the probabil-
ity of error is below a certain threshold. While the expressions for Pd and Pf in
Section 3.2 can be used to choose the parameters, the equations are non-linear and
cannot be solved easily. Hence, in this section, we derive bounds on the achievable
error probabilities using fingerprints of a given length and provide guidelines for
choosing the fingerprint length required to achieve a desired detection accuracy. We
provide an intuitive interpretation of these bounds and show that content identifi-
cation with a false alarm requirement shares some similarities with the problem of
joint source channel coding.
3.3.1 Error Exponents
Consider the detection problem where the detector is only interested in de-
ciding whether a query video is a modified version of some video in the database
or not. As before, we examine the case of i.i.d. binary fingerprints with the corre-
sponding decision rule given by Eqn. (3.6). As we are interested in deriving bounds,
we assume, for simplicity, that q = 1 in the decision rule. The probability of false
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Pr(d(Y,X(i)) < τ |H0),
= N Pr(d(Y,X(1)) < τ |H0), (3.11)
where we have used the union bound and the fact that the fingerprints X(i) are
i.i.d. As discussed in the previous section, under H0, Y and X
(1) are independent
with each component being equally likely to be 0 or 1. Thus, the XOR of Y and
X(1) is uniformly distributed over all binary strings of length L. The Hamming




x∈{0,1}L 1({wt(x) < τ}) = 12LSL,τ , where 1(·) is an indicator function and SL,τ
is the number of binary vectors within a sphere of radius τ in {0, 1}L. Let λ = τ
L
be
the normalized radius. The volume of the sphere SL,Lλ, for λ ≤ 12 can be bounded
as
SL,Lλ ≤ 2Lh(λ),
where h(p) = −p log2 p−(1−p) log2(1−p) is the entropy function [69]. By combining
this result with Eqn. (3.11), the probability of false alarm can be bounded from above
as
Pf (Lλ) ≤ N2−LSL,τ
≤ N2−L(1−h(λ)) (3.12)
where τ = Lλ. The same result can been obtained by applying the Chernoff bound
to upper bound Pr(d(Y,X(1)) < Lλ) for λ < 1
2
, with d(Y,X(1)) being a binomial
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random variable with parameters L and 1
2
[73]. However, we prefer this approach as
it provides an intuitive explanation of the bounds, which is discussed in Section 3.3.3.
We next consider the probability of a missed detection Pm = 1− Pd. Suppose
that X(i) is the fingerprint of a video V(i) in the database and that Y is the finger-
print of a modified version of V(i). A missed detection occurs if no fingerprint in
the database is within a distance τ of the query fingerprint Y. The probability of a
missed detection can thus be bounded by the probability that the distance between
Y and the original fingerprint X(i) is larger than τ :








≤ Pr(d(Y,X(i)) > Lλ|Hi)
Since Y is generated by flipping each bit of X(i) with a probability p, d(Y,X(i)) is
distributed according to a binomial random variable with parameters L and p so
that Pm ≤ Pr(B > τ), where B is a binomial random variable with distribution
Binomial(L, p). By the Chernoff bound [73], the tail probability of the binomial
distribution can be bounded as
Pr(B ≥ Lλ) ≤ 2−LD(λ||p)
where D(λ||p) is the Kullback-Leibler distance between two Bernoulli distributions
with parameters λ and p respectively. Thus, the probability of missed detection
when τ = Lλ can be bounded as
Pm(Lλ) ≤ 2−LD(λ||p). (3.13)
These bounds on Pf and Pm may be interpreted as consequences of the large de-
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viations principle [21]. As the Chernoff bound is asymptotically tight, the bounds





Eqns. (3.12) and (3.13) show the tradeoff between the probability of false alarm
Pf , the probability of missed detection Pm and the number of fingerprints N in the
database. For example, given N videos, reducing the Pf would require 1− h(λ) to
be as large as possible, or equivalently, λ must be as small as possible. However,
reducing λ leads to an increase in the Pm. To further examine this tradeoff, let us
define the rate R as N = 2LR, the false alarm error exponent as Ef = 1− h(λ)−R,
and the missed detection error exponent as Em = D(λ||p), so that Pf ≤ 2−LEf and
Pm ≤ 2−LEm. In the Neyman-Pearson setting, given a certain number of videos
N and fingerprint length L, suppose we wish to ensure that Pf ≤ ǫ = 2−L∆ and
minimize Pm. This is equivalent to maximizing Em for a fixed rate R while ensuring
that Ef ≥ ∆:
max
λ
Em = D(λ||p) subject to 1− h(λ)− R ≥ ∆. (3.14)
As the objective function is increasing in λ, while the constraint is decreasing
in λ, the maximum is achieved when 1−h(λ)−R = ∆. Under this setting, Figure 3.4
shows the maximum achievable missed detection error exponent Em as a function of
the false alarm error exponent ∆, for a fixed rate R, when p = 0.3. From the figure,
we observe that at a given rate R, Em reduces as a function of ∆, which implies
that for a fixed number of fingerprints in the database, reducing the false alarms
leads to an increase in the number of missed detections, and vice versa. From the
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Figure 3.4: Error exponent for missed detection as a function of the rate for
different values of the false positive error exponent.
figure, we also observe that for a fixed value of ∆, Em reduces as N increases. This
trend matches the results presented in Section 3.2.
To ensure that Pm < 0.5, the decision threshold τ = Lλ should be greater
than the mean of the binomial distribution Lp. As the entropy function h(λ) is
monotonically increasing for λ < 0.5, this would in turn imply that the false alarm
exponent ∆ = 1− h(λ)−R ≤ 1− h(p)− R. Hence, to ensure that Pf ≤ ǫ = 2−L∆,






≤ 1− h(p). (3.15)
Thus, given a video database of size N , to ensure that the probability of false alarm
Pf ≤ ǫ when the attack alters on average a fraction p of the hash bits, the length
of the fingerprints used for identification should be chosen large enough to satisfy
Eqn. (3.15). The corresponding probability of missed detection is then less than
2−LEm, where Em can be computed from Eqn. (3.14). It should be noted that at
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extremely small values of the probability of false alarm, the model mismatch between
the i.i.d. model and the practical fingerprint distribution can cause discrepancies
between the predicted and practical values of Pf . The required fingerprint length
derived from this bound can serve as a guideline for choosing the fingerprint length
in a practical system, with suitable compensations to allow for model mismatch.
3.3.2 Bounds on the Error Probabilities for the Identifica-
tion Problem
Similar bounds on the various errors may be derived in the identification prob-
lem. As the expression for the false alarm probability in the identification problem is
identical to that in the detection problem, it can be bounded by Pf ≤ 2−L(1−h(λ)−R).
Now, consider the probability of misclassification Pmc:











= (N − 1) Pr(d(Y,X(1)) < Lλ|H1),
≤ 2−L(1−h(λ)−R)
where we have used the Chernoff bound and replaced N − 1 by N . Now let P ′ =
Pr(d(Y,X(i)) > Lλ|Hi). As discussed in the previous subsection, this probability
can be bounded using the Chernoff bound as P ′ ≤ 2−LD(λ||p). The probability of not
64
making a correct decision 1− Pc is then bounded by:
1− Pc ≤ Pmc + P ′
≤ 2−L(1−h(λ)−R) + 2−LD(λ||p).
These results are similar to the bounds derived in [25] and [27, Problems 5.14 and
5.15] for the problem of decoding error correcting codes with an erasure option.
3.3.3 A Sphere Packing Perspective
In the previous subsections, we have examined the relation between the rate
R, the missed detection error exponent Em, and the false alarm error exponent ∆.
We now provide an intuitive explanation of the theoretical results obtained.
Consider the space of all binary strings of length L, represented by the dashed
circle in Figure 3.5. Let the N binary fingerprints X(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N present in
the database be represented by the solid dots in the figure and the circles around
the dots represent the detection regions for the respective fingerprints. Any query
fingerprint that falls within such a sphere is identified as the fingerprint represented
by the center of the sphere. The number of such spheres controls the rate R, and
the volume of the spheres determines the probability of false alarm and missed
detections.
To ensure a low probability of missed detection when the probability of a bit
flipping is p, the detection region around each fingerprint should include all binary
strings that are within a Hamming distance Lp from the fingerprint. The volume of
such a sphere of radius Lp is SL,Lp, which for large L is approximately SL,Lp ≈ 2Lh(p).
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As we have assumed that in the null hypothesis, the fingerprints of the videos absent
from the database are uniformly distributed over the entire space of binary strings








which upon rearrangement gives Eqn. (3.15). To achieve a higher rate, we would
like to pack more such spheres into the binary space, but this would increase the
probability of false alarms. Similarly, to reduce the probability of missed detection,
the volume of the decoding region around each fingerprint has to be increased, which
would also increase Pf and reduce the number of spheres that can be packed into
the binary space.
We see that the fingerprinting problem shares some analogies with source and
channel coding. In channel coding, to achieve capacity, we are interested in packing
as many spheres as possible into the binary space such that their overlap is minimum.
In source coding with a fidelity criterion (rate-distortion theory), we are interested
in covering the entire space with as few spheres of fixed size as possible. Here, to
minimize the probability of false alarms, we would like to cover the space as sparsely
as possible, but the conflicting objective of increasing the rate requires packing as
many spheres as possible. Thus, fingerprinting can be thought of as being similar




of length L Ball of
radius Lp
Figure 3.5: Sphere packing perspective of content fingerprinting.
3.4 Evaluation of a Practical Fingerprinting Scheme
In this section, we examine the applicability of our theoretical results to a
practical identification scheme. We use a simple image fingerprinting scheme based
on the wavelet transform coefficients [55] as an example. A similar scheme for video
fingerprinting based on DCT coefficients has been proposed in [15]. We present
results for image identification, but the results can be easily extended to the case of
video or audio identification using schemes such as [15].
3.4.1 Fingerprint Generation
Wavelet coefficients, and in particular, signs of wavelet coefficients have been
used for content identification [3], retrieval of similar images [35], and to generate
fingerprints for image authentication [59]. It has been shown that detail coeffi-
cients of the wavelet transform are symmetric around zero and can be modeled as
67
i.i.d. generalized Gaussian random variables [54]. Thus, quantizing wavelet detail
coefficients to 1 bit would yield i.i.d. equiprobable bits, which could be used as
fingerprints to represent the image.
We decompose a 512 × 512 image using five levels of the wavelet transform
using the Haar wavelet [55], which is chosen because of the low cost for computing
the transform. Each of the four subbands at the coarsest level of decomposition
thus has coefficients of size 16 × 16. We retain only the signs of the coefficients
belonging to these subbands to obtain a 1024-bit sequence. A ‘1’ at a particular
location indicates a positive coefficient, whereas a ‘0’ indicates a negative coefficient.
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of the bits comprising this bit sequence estimated
from 1000 grayscale images of size 512×512. In Figure 3.6(a), we show the fraction
of images (out of 1000) that have a ‘1’ at a particular location. The first 256 bits
correspond to the signs of the approximation coefficients, followed by 256 bits for
each of the horizontal, vertical and diagonal detail coefficients. From this figure,
we observe that the signs of the approximation coefficients are not independent
and equally likely. This is due to the fact that the approximation coefficients for
natural images are likely to be correlated with each other. The same holds true
for the horizontal and vertical detail coefficients, since coefficients which correspond
to strong horizontal or vertical edges would lie along the same row or column,
respectively. The signs of the diagonal detail coefficients, however, appear to be
less correlated and approximately equally likely to be ‘0’ or ‘1’. Figure 3.6(b) shows
the fraction of bits that are ‘1’ for a given image. We observe that approximately
half the bits are ‘1’, indicating that these bits are approximately independent and
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of fingerprint bits obtained by quantizing wavelet coeffi-
cients. (a) Fraction of images with a bit ‘1’ at a given location and (b) Fraction of
bits that are ‘1’ for a given image.
equally likely. The coefficients at the lowest level of decomposition are also expected
to be robust to common signal processing operations and can be used as fingerprints
for image identification.
In summary, given an image, we resample it to size 512×512, perform wavelet
decomposition up to 5 levels, and extract the diagonal detail coefficients. We then
retain the signs of these coefficients to form a 256-bit fingerprint for the given image.
3.4.2 Attacks
We evaluate the ability of these fingerprints to correctly identify an image after
it has undergone the potential malicious attacks listed in Table 3.1. As the image
pixel values are normalized to lie between 0 and 1, addition of zero mean Gaussian
noise with standard deviation σ = 0.2 represents a strong attack and introduces
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Table 3.1: List of attacks tested
Attack No. Attack Parameters
1-4 Zero-mean Gaussian Noise Addition σ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2




] ∆ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2
9 Histogram Equalization
10-19 Gamma Correction γ = 0.75 : 0.05 : 1.25\{1}
20-28 Average, Median, and Gaussian Filtering Filter Size = 3, 5, 7
29-31 JPEG Compression Quality Factor = 25, 50, 75
32-34 Rotation by multiples of 90◦
a lot of distortion, as shown in Figure 3.7. Rotation by multiples of 90◦ (Attack
No. 32-34) are very strong attacks that may be of concern if the image/video is being
viewed on a portable device, which provides freedom in adjusting the orientation.
The strength of an attack can be measured in terms of the probability (p) of
a fingerprint bit being altered after the attack. Figure 3.8 shows the probability
of a fingerprint bit being changed as a result of each attack, averaged over 1000
images. We observe that the rotation attacks are devastating, and the probability
of a fingerprint bit being altered is almost 0.5 for each of them. Our analysis of
the probability of correct identification and false alarm in Section 3.2 suggests that
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Attack 4 Attack 9 Attack 32 Attack 33 Attack 34
Figure 3.7: Some attacked versions of the Lena image. (The list of attacks is
provided in Table 3.1).









Figure 3.8: Probability of a fingerprint bit flipping averaged over 1000 images for
each attack.
the fingerprinting scheme will not accurately identify the images after these attacks
due to the high value of p. Among the other attacks, Gaussian noise addition with




We now evaluate the accuracy of the content identification system under these
attacks. Our database consists of N = 1000 grayscale images of size 512×512. The
attacks in Table 3.1 are applied to each of these images to obtain a set of 34, 000
attacked images. The length of the fingerprint used is L = 256 bits. The threshold
for detection τ is chosen to achieve a probability of false alarm ǫ = 10−6. From
Eqn. (3.15), the maximum attack strength that can be resisted under these settings
is found to be p = 0.3. Thus, we expect that the rotated images (Attack No. 32-34)
which have p = 0.5 will not be detected correctly. The other attacks No. 1−31 have
p < 0.3 and hence we expect the probability of detection Pd to be close to 1.
For the detection problem, we compute the fingerprint of an attacked image
and compare it with each fingerprint in the database. We then use the decision
rule described in Eqn. (3.6) to perform the classification. If the minimum distance
dmin < τ , we declare the image to be present in the database. Figure 3.9 shows the
probability of detection obtained using this decision rule under each of the attacks.
As expected, the images which correspond to rotated versions of images in the
database are almost never detected (Attacks No. 32 − 34). This problem can be
alleviated by suitably designing the fingerprints, as discussed in Section 3.4.5.
Under most of the other attacks, the probability of detection Pd is close to 1,
except for addition of Gaussian noise with large variance (attacks no. 2-4). Under
these attacks, the fraction of fingerprint bits altered for some images is larger than
0.3. Thus, according to our theoretical analysis, these images cannot be identified
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Figure 3.9: Probability that an attacked image is detected as a modified version
of an image in the database Pd.
and the probability of detection, Pd, is less than 1 for these attacks. The overall
probability of detection for attacks no. 1-31 was 0.991.
For the identification problem, we use the ML detector in Eqn. (3.10) to per-
form the classification. We found that every image that was detected as being
present in the database in the detection problem was correctly identified, so that
Pc = 0.991 and the probability of misclassification Pmc = 0.
The probability of false alarm Pf was estimated using the leave-one-out proce-
dure in both the detection and identification problems. Every image in the database
was treated as a probe image and compared with the remaining images. If the mini-
mum distance of the fingerprint dmin < τ , the image constituted a false alarm. Using
the fingerprint of length 256 bits, no false alarms were observed in our experiments.
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3.4.4 Influence of the Fingerprint Length
Based on the analysis in Section 3.3, we know that longer fingerprints can
resist stronger attacks. In this subsection, we perform simulations to determine the
influence of the fingerprint length on the detection performance.
To generate fingerprints of different lengths, the number of levels of the wavelet
decomposition is varied. For example, to generate fingerprints of length 1024 bits,
we resample the image to size 512 × 512 and decompose it to four levels using the
Haar wavelet. We then extract the signs of the diagonal detail coefficients at the
coarsest level of decomposition. As the number of levels of decompositions becomes
smaller, the diagonal detail coefficients correspond to higher frequencies and we
expect these features to be less robust to modifications. Figure 3.10 shows the prob-
ability of a fingerprint bit flipping after attacks, for fingerprints of length 64, 256,
and 1024 corresponding to 6, 5, and 4 levels of decomposition respectively. We ob-
serve that as the number of decomposition levels decreases (corresponding to longer
fingerprints), the probability that a fingerprint bit changes increases, indicating that
these coefficients are less robust to modifications.
From Eqn. (3.15), we find that for N = 1000 and ǫ = 10−6, the maximum
probability of a bit flipping (p) that can be tolerated by fingerprints of length 64,
256, and 1024 bits is 0.1, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively. Thus, we expect the fingerprint
with length 1024 bits to have a higher value of Pd, as it can resist stronger attacks.
In Figure 3.11, we examine the influence of the fingerprint length L on the
probability of detection Pd under various attacks. In each case, the threshold for
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Figure 3.10: Probability of a fingerprint bit flipping under an attack on the image
as a function of the fingerprint length.
detection τ was chosen to attain the desired value of Pf = ǫ = 10
−6 as given by
Eqn. (3.15). We observe that the fingerprint with length 1024 bits has the highest
probability of detection. Even though the probability of a bit being altered after an
attack p is higher for the 1024-bit fingerprint than the other fingerprints, the longer
length of the fingerprint compensates for the reduced robustness of each individual
bit, and leads to a higher overall probability of detection.
In Table 3.2, we compare the overall probability of detection under attacks
no. 1−31 as a function of the fingerprint length. We observe that as the fingerprint
length increases, Pd also increases. There was only one case of false alarm when
using fingerprints of length 1024 bits. Upon closer observation, it was found that
these two images actually corresponded to the same scene, but the number of objects
and illumination conditions in the picture were slightly different. These two images
can be regarded as being obtained from each other after significant modification,
such as insertion or deletion of objects, change in brightness, and modification of
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Figure 3.11: Probability of detection under various attacks as a function of the
fingerprint length.
the details in the image. The overall attack would change a large fraction of the
fingerprint bits, and is hence not identified using the shorter fingerprints. Since the
1024 bit fingerprint is more robust against changes in the fingerprint bits, it is able to
determine that these two images are not independent of each other, and could have
originated from the same source. Thus, the length of the fingerprint plays a crucial
factor in determining the performance of the fingerprinting scheme, as predicted by
our theoretical analysis in Section 3.3.
Under the identification problem, every image that is detected as having orig-
inated from an image present in the database is also correctly identified, so that
Pc = Pd. Thus, the probability of misclassification as obtained from our experi-
ments is Pmc = 0 and the probability of correct identification is the same as the
second column in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Overall Pd and Pf obtained against Attacks No. 1-31 as a function of
the fingerprint length.















Figure 3.12: Probability of a bit flipping p for the rotationally invariant fingerprints
under various attacks.
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3.4.5 Proper Choice of Hash Features
Our attack model assumes that most attacks on multimedia can be modeled
as additive noise in the fingerprint space. For some fingerprinting schemes, desyn-
chronization attacks, including rotation, cropping, and geometric attacks, may not
be directly modeled as additive noise fingerprint space. However, by suitably de-
signing the features and applying appropriate preprocessing, it is possible to reduce
these attacks to the additive noise model. We briefly illustrate the importance of
appropriate choice of features using the example of the rotation attacks studied in
Section 3.4.2. If robustness against rotations by multiples of 90◦ is desired, the
following modification of the fingerprint scheme in Section 3.4.1 can improve the
robustness against rotations.
Given a 512 × 512 image, we obtain four images corresponding to rotations
by multiples of 90◦, which are then summed pixel-wise. The resulting image is
decomposed up to four levels using the Haar wavelet and the signs of the 1024
diagonal detail coefficients at the coarsest level of decomposition are extracted. As
these bits are dependent, we retain only 25% of the bits that correspond to the
coefficients in the upper left corner of the subband. The 256 bits thus obtained
form the fingerprint for the image, which is invariant under rotations of the original
image by multiples of 90◦.
Figure 3.12 shows the probability of a bit flipping under the attacks listed in
Table 3.1 for this modified scheme. We observe that none of the bits are altered
under rotations by multiples of 90◦. The fingerprint bits are also moderately robust
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under the other attacks no. 1-31. Under the detection problem we obtained Pd = 1
under the rotation attacks no. 32-34, while the overall Pd for attacks no. 1− 31 was
0.99. Thus, a suitable choice of the fingerprint features can enhance the robustness
against attacks.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented a decision theoretic framework for analyzing
binary fingerprint-based content identification schemes. We formulate the problem
of detecting whether a given video or audio is present in a database of copyrighted
material as a binary hypothesis test and the problem of correctly identifying the
original content corresponding to a given query object as a multiple hypothesis test.
Under this framework, we considered the case of fingerprinting schemes that generate
i.i.d. equally likely bits and modeled distortions on the host content as altering
each fingerprint bit independently with probability p. We derived expressions for
the probability of correct identification under this model and studied the tradeoff
between the number of fingerprints, the robustness, the identification performance
and the length of the fingerprints. To understand the fundamental limits on the
identification capability, we next derived bounds on the achievable error probabilities
and characterized the tradeoff between the detection probability and the number of
fingerprints in terms of the error exponents. We then derived guidelines for choosing
the fingerprint length to attain a desired performance objective and provided an
interpretation of our results from a joint source-channel coding perspective.
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Under the proposed framework, we also examined a practical binary hash-
based content identification scheme which utilizes the signs of the diagonal detail
coefficients in the wavelet decomposition of the image. The simulation results con-
firm our theoretical predictions. We also briefly discussed the importance of choosing
appropriate hash features to achieve robustness against attacks.
Our analysis provides a quantitative evaluation of how various system parame-
ters influence the identification accuracy, and guidelines to choose these parameters
to achieve a desired accuracy. It also reveals connections between the fingerprinting
problem and other areas such as sphere-packing, joint source channel coding, and
errors and erasures decoding.
The results in this chapter have been mainly presented in the context of content
fingerprinting, but they are also applicable in many other applications, such as
biometrics based identification. For example, Vetro et al. recently showed that
by suitably transforming features extracted for human fingerprint matching using
minutiae, the biometric data can be transformed into i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.5) bits and
that the distortions caused while recapturing the fingerprint can be modeled by a






The analysis and results described in the previous chapter have been focused
on fingerprints with i.i.d. components and provides useful performance bounds
and guidelines for designing fingerprinting schemes. Many practical fingerprinting
schemes, however, generate fingerprints with correlated components. While it is
possible to include an explicit decorrelation stage to remove such dependencies and
obtain a shorter fingerprint with independent bits, to meet stringent computational
requirements in large-scale practical deployments, it may be preferable to use the
correlated fingerprint bits directly without incurring the additional computational
cost for decorrelation. Another important reason that correlated fingerprints are
used in practice is to cope with desynchronization. For example, fingerprints may
be extracted from overlapping segments of multimedia to deal with cropping issues,
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which results in correlated components.
We use a Markov Random Field to model such correlations in the fingerprints
and the noise introduced through distortion of the content. We then describe an
approach inspired by statistical physics to compute the probability of errors and
study the impact of the correlation on the identification performance of different
detectors. Although we use a simple 2-D Ising model as a concrete example to
illustrate our results, the analysis and the proposed method are quite general and
can be applied to any Markov Random Field. We begin with a brief review of
Markov Random Fields in the next subsection.
4.1 Markov Random Fields
Markov Random Fields (MRFs) are a generalization of Markov chains in which
time indices are replaced by space indices [40]. MRFs are undirected graphical
models and represent conditional independence relations among random variables.
MRFs have been used in image processing [36, Chapter 6], image modeling [8, 39],
and computer vision [9, Chapter 8] to model correlated random variables.
An MRF is represented by an undirected graph G = (V, E) with a set of nodes
V = {1, 2, . . . , N} and a set E of edges between nodes, where an edge is represented
by an unordered pair of nodes. Each node i ∈ V represents a random variable Xi
and the vector X denotes all random variables represented by the MRF. Two nodes
i and j are said to be neighbors if there is an edge between them, i.e. (i, j) ∈ E . A
set of nodes C is called a maximal clique if every pair of nodes in C are neighbors
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and no node in V\C is a neighbor of every node in C. Denote the set of variables
corresponding to the nodes in C by XC and their realizations by xC. The set of all
the maximal cliques in the graph G is denoted by C.
An energy function EC(xC) is associated with every maximal clique C ∈ C
that maps the values xC of the nodes in C to a real number. The energy of the
entire configuration x is defined as E(x) =
∑
C∈C EC(xC). The joint probability
distribution of all the random variables represented by the MRF is then given as
p(X = x) = 1
Z
exp (−E(x)), where Z =∑x exp (−E(x)) is a normalization constant
called the partition function.
4.2 Model for a Block-based Fingerprinting Scheme
We model content fingerprints as a Markov Random Field where each fin-
gerprint value is represented as a node in the MRF, and pairs of nodes that have
dependencies are joined by edges [89, 91]. As a concrete example of our modeling
approach, we describe a model for a representative fingerprinting scheme that parti-
tions each video frame into blocks and extracts one bit from each block [53]. While
we use a simple two-dimensional model for ease of illustration, the analysis can be
extended to three-dimensional and more complex models.
Suppose that each video frame of size PH×QW is partitioned into PQ blocks
of size H × W each and one bit of the fingerprint is extracted from each block.
For example, the fingerprint bit could be obtained by thresholding the average








Figure 4.1: Markov Random Field model for a block-based fingerprinting scheme:
(a) fingerprint components and (b) fingerprint and noise.
these bits are likely to be correlated. We denote the bit extracted from the (i, j)th
block by X ′i,j . For notational convenience, we use a vector X to represent the bits
X ′i,j, 1 ≤ i ≤ P, 1 ≤ j ≤ Q, which could be obtained by any consistent reordering,
such as raster scanning. Specifically, let X(i−1)Q+j = X
′
i,j. The random variables Xk
are represented as nodes in a graph and may take one of two values ±1, with bit value
‘0’ represented as +1 and bit value ‘1’ represented as −1. Each node is connected
to the four nearest neighbors, so that the overall graph G0 = (V0, E0) satisfies 4-
connectivity as shown in Figure 4.1(a). The set of nodes V0 = {1, 2, . . . PQ}. The
corresponding set of edges E0 contains pairs of the form ((i−1)Q+j, (i−1)Q+j+1),
which are horizontally adjacent neighbors, or ((i−1)Q+j, iQ+j), which are vertically
adjacent neighbors.
As described in Section 4.1, the joint probability distribution of the fingerprint
can be specified by defining an energy function for the model. We use the energy
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This corresponds to the 2-D Ising model that has been widely used in statistical
physics to model ferromagnetism arising out of interactions between individual spins.
Here η controls the correlation between nodes that are connected and ν determines
the marginal distribution of the individual bits. A higher value for η would increase
the correlation among neighboring bits, and large ν would bias the bits to be +1.
The joint distribution can then be written as p0(x) =
1
Z0
exp(−E0(x)), with Z0 being
the normalization constant to ensure that the distribution sums to 1.
The above model describes the fingerprint bits obtained from the original
video frame. In many practical applications, fingerprints are extracted from possi-
bly modified versions of the video and may be noisy. The noise components may
be correlated and also dependent on the fingerprint bits. To accommodate such
modifications, we propose a joint model for the noise bits and the fingerprint bits
of the original unmodified video, which is shown in Figure 4.1(b). The filled circles
represent the noise bits and the open circles represent the fingerprint bits. The solid
edges capture the dependencies among the fingerprint components, while the dashed
and dotted edges represent the local correlations among the noise bits. The dashed
edges capture the dependence between the noise bits and the fingerprint bits. The
noise may be causally dependent on the fingerprint of the original video, but the
fingerprint bits of the original video should not be influenced by the noise. However,
the addition of these undirected edges makes the graph symmetric with respect to
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the fingerprint and noise bits and does not accurately reflect the causal dependence.
Factor graphs may be used to represent this dependence, and will be addressed in
our future work.
We consider the case where the noise bits may be mutually dependent, but
are independent of the fingerprint bits, implying that the dashed edges between
the noise bits and the fingerprint bits are absent. In this example, the model for
the noise bits N reduces to a 2-D Ising model with underlying graph G1 = (V1, E1)









and the distribution is specified as p1(n) =
1
Z1
exp(−E1(n)). The parameters α and
γ control the marginal distribution and the pairwise correlation among the noise
bits, respectively.
The above MRF can be used to model block based binary video fingerprints
computed on a frame by frame basis. For other fingerprinting schemes, different
graphs can be used to capture the correlations among the fingerprint components.
4.2.1 Hypothesis Testing
As discussed in Section 3.1, content identification using fingerprints can be
modeled as a multiple hypothesis test. Under the MRF model, since it is difficult to
directly compute the error probabilities for the (N+1)-ary hypothesis test, we first
consider a binary hypothesis test, where the detector compares the query fingerprint
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with a given fingerprint from the database.
Given a query video Z and a reference video V in its database, consider the
problem where the detector has to decide whether Z is derived from V or whether
the two videos are unrelated. To do so, the detector computes the fingerprints
y and x from the videos Z and V, respectively. The corresponding noise in the
bit domain will then be given by the XOR of the two fingerprints. In the MRF
model, as a logical value b is represented by (−1)b, the XOR operation corresponds
to an element-wise multiplication ⊗, so that the noise n = x ⊗ y. The detector
then performs a binary hypothesis test with the null hypothesis H0 that the two
fingerprints are independent and the alternate hypothesis H1 that the fingerprint y
is a noisy version of x:
H0 : (x,y) ∼ p0(x)p0(y),
H1 : (x,y) ∼ p0(x)p1(n), (4.3)
where p0(·) is the distribution of the fingerprints and p1(·) is the distribution of the
noise.
We consider a Neyman-Pearson setting, where the detector seeks to maximize
the probability of detection under the constraint that the probability of false alarm
does not exceed ǫ. The optimal decision rule is to compare the log likelihood ratio
(LLR) to a threshold:





where the constants have been absorbed into the threshold τ , which is chosen such
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that the probability of false alarm = ǫ. In cases where the LLR is discrete, it may
be necessary to incorporate randomization when the LLR equals the threshold.
For example, for the block-based binary fingerprinting scheme model described














If the fingerprint bits are i.i.d. and equally likely to be ±1, corresponding to η =
ν = 0, and the noise bits are independent (γ = 0), the optimum decision rule
reduces to a comparison of the Hamming distance between x and y to a threshold.
However, when the bits are not independent, a decision rule that compares the
Hamming distance to a threshold is suboptimal. The LLR can be interpreted as
performing an implicit decorrelation by compensating the Hamming distance for
the empirical correlations among the fingerprint components. We would like to
quantify the accuracy using this optimal decision rule and the performance loss
when the Hamming distance is used instead.
While we have adopted a Neyman-Pearson approach based on the likelihood
ratio test to derive the optimal detector, another alternative may be to use a χ2-
test. When a large number of observations is available, it has been shown that
under some conditions, the distribution of the log-likelihood ratio under the null
hypothesis converges to a χ2 distribution with the appropriate number of degrees of
freedom [48, 100]. The threshold in the decision rule can then be chosen based on
the χ2 distribution, given the constraint on the probability of false alarm.
Under the Neyman-Pearson setting, define the probability of detection for this
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binary hypothesis test as P
(b)
d = Pr(LLR(x,y) > τ |H1) and probability of false
alarm P
(b)
f = Pr(LLR(x,y) > τ |H0). One approach to estimate the error proba-
bilities would be to draw samples from the MRF distribution using a traditional
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique and use these samples to estimate
the probabilities [102]. However, a main challenge in accurately estimating the prob-
abilities is that such error events have small probability of occurrence and are rarely
observed in a typical MCMC simulation.
An alternative approach is to use the large deviations principle to obtain expo-
nential bounds on the probability of making an error [21, Theorem 2.3.6 and 3.4.3].
Evaluating the exponent would then require the computation of a transform of the
asymptotic limit of the cumulant generating function of the log likelihood ratio [21].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no closed form expression or simple technique
to evaluate this rate function when the relevant distributions are Markov Random
Fields, and we may have to resort to simulation-based techniques such as Markov
Chain Monte Carlo as well. Instead, we take a different approach inspired by sta-
tistical physics to first estimate the so-called density of states and then utilize this
information to estimate the probability of making an error.
4.2.2 Density of States
For ease of illustration, we again use the example of the binary fingerprint
model described in Section 4.2. Suppose we define M(x) =
∑
i xi and Ecorr(x) =
−∑(j,k)∈E0 xjxk, the LLR in Eqn. (4.4) can be written as LLR(x,y) = −νM(y) +
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ηEcorr(y) + αM(n) − γEcorr(n), since E0 = E1 in this model. Similarly, the energy
for the fingerprint bits and the noise, E0(x) and E1(n), described in Eqns. (4.1) and
(4.2) can be rewritten in terms of these parameters. Thus, the tuple
S(x,y) = (M(x), Ecorr(x),M(y), Ecorr(y),M(n), Ecorr(n)), (4.5)
captures all necessary information regarding the configuration (x,y), and is a suffi-
cient statistic [67] for the p0 and p1 distributions. Define g(s) = |{(x,y) : S(x,y) =
s}| as the number of configurations that have the same state s. The function g(·) is
referred to as the “density of states” in the physics literature and it depends only on
the underlying graphical model and is independent of the parameters (ν, η, α, γ) of
the distributions. In some respects, the state of a vector is similar to the concept of
“type” of a sequence in information theory. The main difference is that the method
of types is typically used in conjunction with i.i.d. variables, whereas we consider
correlated random variables in this section.
As all configurations (x,y) with the same state have the same LLR and prob-
ability of occurrence, the probability of detection P
(b)










g(s)1 ({LLR(s) > τ}) ps,1(s), (4.6)
where the summation in Eqn. (4.6) is over all possible values of s, ps,1(s) and LLR(s)
are the probability under H1 and the LLR, respectively, of any configuration (x,y)






g(s)1 ({LLR(s) > τ}) ps,0(s), (4.7)
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where ps,0(s) is the probability under H0 of a configuration with state s. As the LLR
and the probabilities p1(n) and p0(x) depend only on s, knowledge of g(s) allows




f . We also note that the M(·) terms in the state vector






∼ Θ(L2) values. Thus, the number of states is a polynomial function of
the number of bits and the summations in Eqns. (4.6) and (4.7) have manageable




f has now been
converted into one of estimating the density of states g(s).
An algorithm to estimate the density of states was proposed by Wang and
Landau in [96]. A summary of this algorithm and the key steps are provided as
an appendix in Section 4.5. The main idea behind the algorithm is to construct a
Markov chain that has 1
g(s)
as its stationary distribution and use samples drawn from
this distribution to estimate g(s). An advantage of this “Wang-Landau” algorithm
is that states with low probability of occurrence are also visited as often as high
probability states, enabling us to estimate their probabilities accurately. We first





f using Eqns. (4.6) and (4.7). As the number of states is polynomial in the





d . However, the density of states estimation is limited by the amount
of memory and computational resources available and cannot be used for arbitrarily
large graphical models. In such situations, nested models may be used for modeling
the fingerprints and will be examined in our future work.
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4.2.3 Bounds on Error Probabilities for Overall Matching




f obtained using the above technique, for com-
pleteness, we now derive bounds on the probability of correct identification for the
overall matching process. We assume that the detector has no a priori knowledge of
which video is more likely to be queried and compute the error probabilities assum-
ing that the queries are equiprobable. If the detector has prior knowledge about the
queries, these could be incorporated into the decision rule under a Bayesian setting.
Consider the probability of false alarm Pf , which can occur if the LLR of
the query and any reference fingerprint exceeds the threshold. The false alarm
probability can then be bounded by





f ≪ 1. Now suppose that the query video is actually a modified version
of V(i). A misclassification can occur if LLR(X(j),Y) > τ for any j 6= i. Thus, the
probability of misclassification can be bounded as:
Pmc ≤ 1− (1− P (b)f )N−1 ≤ (N − 1)P
(b)
f .
An incorrect decision happens when either a misclassification occurs, or if LLR(X(j),Y) <
τ , so that
1− Pc ≤ 1− P (b)d + Pmc
⇒ Pc ≥ P (b)d −NP
(b)
f .
Thus, given a desired overall probability of correct identification and false alarm,




d can be computed based on these bounds and used
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to choose the appropriate threshold in the binary hypothesis test. As these bounds
have been derived by extending the results from the binary hypothesis test to the
identification problem, the bounds may not be tight. Finding tighter bounds on the
error probabilities for the identification problem when correlated fingerprints are
used, is an open research problem that will be addressed in future work.
Another interesting question is how the error probabilities for correlated fin-
gerprints scale as the number N and length L of the fingerprints increases. In the
i.i.d. case, when N grows exponentially with the length as N = 2LR, if the error
exponents corresponding to the rate R as discussed in Section 3.2 are positive, the
error probabilities reduce exponentially with the length L. It remains an open ques-
tion whether this result would still hold for the case of correlated fingerprints, and if
it does hold, how the error exponents would depend on the parameters of the MRF
distribution and the resulting correlation.
4.3 Numerical Evaluation





described in the previous section to study the influence of correlation among the fin-
gerprint components on the detection performance. We focus on binary fingerprint-
ing schemes and provide numerical results for the model described in Section 4.2.
We present results for the estimation of the density of states in Section 4.3.2, and
compare the performance of the LLR and Hamming distance based detectors via
numerical evaluations in Section 4.3.3. In Section 4.3.5, we validate the theoretical
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predictions by experiments using a database of images.
4.3.1 Correlation Structure among Fingerprint and Noise
Components
We first analyze the correlation structure among the fingerprint components
and noise under the MRF model. The correlation among the fingerprint components
depends on the covariance E[XXT ]. It is possible for two realizations X(i) and X(j)
that have the same state s to have different outer products X(i)X(i)T and X(j)X(j)T
depending on the exact arrangement of +1 and −1 within the vectors. Hence, the
correlation cannot be directly obtained from the density of states. Instead, we draw
108 samples from the MRF distribution using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm [32]
by retaining only 1 out of 100 iterations to reduce the effect of correlations between
successive iterates in the MCMC simulations. We then use these samples to estimate
the correlation among the components. As the states with small probability do not
significantly alter the correlation, this approach gives us an accurate estimate of the
correlation.
We stack the fingerprint and noise samples into a single vector [XT NT ]T and
compute the correlation coefficient among its elements. Figure 4.2 shows the corre-
lation coefficient among the fingerprint bits and noise for a 4×4 model, obtained by
setting ν = 0, η = 0.3, α = 0.3, and γ = 0.1. For ease of visualization, Figure 4.3(a)
shows the correlation between the (1, 1)th bit (top left corner) and every other bit











Figure 4.2: Correlation among the fingerprint and noise components under the
MRF model for ν = 0, η = 0.3, α = 0.3, and γ = 0.1.
respectively. Due to symmetry, other bits in corresponding positions have similar
correlations. We observe that the average correlation between each fingerprint bit
and its nearest neighbor ρx ≈ 0.3 and the correlation decays with distance. This is
the typical correlation behavior observed in our model and reflects the correlation
expected in practice - bits extracted from adjacent blocks are expected to be more
correlated than bits extracted from blocks farther apart. The correlation among the
noise bits has a similar structure, as the noise model is similar, while the noise bits
are uncorrelated with the fingerprint bits.
4.3.2 Density of States Estimation
We evaluate the accuracy of the density of states estimation algorithm using
















Figure 4.3: Typical correlation structure among the various fingerprinting bits.
Correlation coefficients for the (a) (1, 1)th bit, (b) (2, 1)th bit, (c) (2, 2)th bit and
the remaining bits. The ‘*’ denotes the bit under consideration.
with periodic boundary conditions [7]. To enable comparison, periodic boundary
conditions are imposed on the graph G0 - the nodes X ′1,j in the top row are con-
nected to the corresponding nodes X ′M,j in the bottom row, and the nodes in the
first column are similarly connected to the nodes in the last column, so that ev-
ery node is 4-connected. 4-connectivity is similarly achieved for the noise nodes
N. We then use the Wang-Landau algorithm to estimate the density of states
g(s) = g(mx, ex, my, ey, mn, en) by performing a random walk in the 6-D parameter
space [96] and use the obtained g(s) to estimate the density of energy states gI(E)






g(mx, E,my, ey, mn, en).
In our simulations, we use the parameters suggested in [96] and the maximum num-
ber of iterations is capped at 1010.
We measure the accuracy of estimation by computing the relative error ε(gI(E))
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Figure 4.4: Relative error in the estimation of density of states for a 4x4 Ising
model with periodic boundary conditions.
in the estimate of the density of states, defined as ε(x) = |x−xest|
x
. Figure 4.4 shows
the relative error in the estimation of the density of states for a 2-D Ising model
of size 4 × 4 with periodic boundary conditions. We observe from the figure that
the maximum relative error is approximately 0.37%, and the mean relative error is
0.1%. These results demonstrate that accurate estimates of the density of states
can be obtained using the Wang-Landau algorithm.
4.3.3 Detection Accuracy of Correlated Fingerprints
To examine the performance of correlated fingerprints, we use the model with-
out periodic boundary conditions, as practical fingerprints are not expected to have
such periodic relationships. The nodes at the corners are only connected to their
two closest neighbors, the remaining nodes at the borders are connected to their
three closest neighbors, and all the other nodes are 4-connected.






f as described in Section 4.2.2 and study the effect of different parameters on the
detection performance. Although errors in the estimation of the density of states will




f , as shown in Section 4.3.2,
these errors are small, and the accuracy can be improved by obtaining a better
estimate of the density of states.
We first examine the effect of the noise on the detection accuracy in Figure 4.5.
We characterize the noise by the probability pn of a noise bit being ‘−1’ which is the
equivalent of a binary ‘1’ bit, and the average correlation among adjacent noise bits
ρn, which are estimated from the MCMC trials. Figure 4.5(a) shows the ROC curves
for a fingerprint of size 4 × 4 bits with correlation ρx = 0.2 under two different pn
and fixed ρn = 0.2, for detection using the LLR statistic and the Hamming distance
statistic. We observe that for a given noise level, the LLR statistic gives 5 − 10%
higher P
(b)
d at a given P
(b)
f compared to the Hamming distance detector. As expected,
the performance for any given detector is worse when there is a higher probability
of the noise changing the fingerprint bits.
Fig 4.5(b) shows the influence of the noise correlation on the detection perfor-
mance. The figure indicates that for a fixed correlation among the fingerprint bits
ρx = 0.2 and a fixed marginal probability of the noise bits pn = 0.3, detection using
the LLR statistic is not significantly affected by the noise correlation. This is due
to the fact that the LLR takes into account the correlation among the noise bits.
On the other hand, using the Hamming distance leads to some degradation in the
performance as the correlation increases. This can be explained by the fact that as
the noise correlation increases, noise vectors with large Hamming weights become
98








































































Figure 4.5: Influence of the noise distribution on the detection: (a) Impact of the
noise marginal distribution pn on the detection performance, ρx = 0.2 and ρn = 0.2,
and (b) Impact of noise correlation ρn at fixed pn = 0.3 and ρx = 0.2.
more probable, leading to higher missed detections.
Next, we examine the influence of the correlation among the fingerprint bits on
the detection accuracy. Figure 4.6 shows the ROC curves for content identification
using fingerprints of size 4× 4 for different correlations, where the noise parameters
pn = ρn = 0.2. We again observe that detection using the LLR statistic, which
compensates for the correlation among the fingerprint bits, is not significantly af-
fected by the correlation. For the Hamming distance statistic, there is an increase
in false alarms at a given P
(b)
d as the correlation among the fingerprints increases,
since similar configurations with smaller distances become more probable.
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Figure 4.6: Influence of correlation of the fingerprint bits on the detection perfor-
mance (pn = ρn = 0.2).
4.3.4 LS Estimation of Parameters
Having examined the performance of the LLR and Hamming distance detectors
for the MRF model through numerical simulations, we next validate our theoretical
predictions through experiments on image databases. To predict the detection ac-
curacy using a given database, we first need to obtain the parameters for the MRF
model that best captures the distribution of the data. We use the Least Squares (LS)
technique for estimating the parameters of the underlying MRF proposed in [23],
which is equivalent to the coding method proposed in [8]. A summary of the es-
timation procedure is provided as appendix in Section 4.6. In this subsection, we
present results on the accuracy of the LS parameter estimation.
To evaluate the accuracy of the LS parameter estimation technique, we inde-


























































Figure 4.7: Accuracy of the LS estimation of the MRF parameters: (a) Mean and
(b) Variance of the estimation error over 1000 trials.
and generate samples from the MRF distribution with these parameters using the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. These samples are then used to obtain estimates
(ν̂, η̂, α̂, γ̂) of the parameters of the MRF distribution, and the error in estimating
the parameters is determined. For example, νerr = |ν − ν̂|, and ηerr, αerr, γerr are
similarly defined. The residues in the LS estimation of the parameters of the finger-
print and noise distributions are also noted. Figure 4.7 shows the mean and variance
of the error in estimating the parameters over 1000 trials. From the figure, we ob-
serve that the LS estimates for the η and γ parameters have approximately 3 − 4
times less error on average, compared to the estimates for ν and α. When a larger
number of samples is available, the estimation accuracy is significantly better for all
the parameters. Further, we observe that the estimation accuracies of η and γ, and
ν and α are similar, since these parameters play similar roles in the fingerprint and
noise distributions.
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4.3.5 Simulation Results using Image Database
In this subsection, we compare the performance predicted by the theoretical
analysis with simulation results obtained using two image databases. The first
database consists of 1000 images downloaded from the Flickr photo hosting service
by searching for the tag “panda”1, and the second database is the Uncompressed
Colour Image Database (UCID) [71]. For extracting the fingerprints, each image is
divided into 16 blocks in a 4×4 grid and the average luminance within each block is
computed. The average luminance is then quantized to one bit accuracy according
to whether it is greater than or lesser than the grayscale value of 128, giving a 16-bit
fingerprint for each image. To evaluate the appropriateness of our model, we require
a distortion that results in the noise in different image blocks being correlated and
significantly alters the fingerprint bits. We choose histogram equalization as the
distortion and apply it to the luminance portion of the image and compute the
noisy versions of the fingerprints. The hypothesis test described in Sec. 4.2.1 is
then performed using the noisy fingerprints. Additionally, 1000 pairs of original
fingerprints are randomly chosen and compared to each other to obtain an estimate
of the false alarm probability. We also estimate the Ising model parameters for the
fingerprints and the noise using the least squares method discussed in 4.3.4, and
obtain the theoretical predictions for the ROC curves as described in Section 4.2.2.
Figs. 4.8 and 4.9 show the results obtained for the panda database and the
UCID images, respectively. Figure 4.8(a) displays the correlation among the finger-
1Links to the images used in the experiments are available at
www.ece.umd.edu/∼varna/panda database/
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print and noise components for the fingerprints computed from the panda database.
We observe that the correlation is similar to the correlation structure for the MRF
model in Figure 4.2. The residue for the LS estimate of the hash parameters is 0.067
and for the noise parameters is 0.06 indicating that the MRF model is a good fit
for this data. Figure 4.8(b) compares the ROC curves obtained from theory and
simulation for the LLR detector and the Hamming distance based detector. As the
data obtained from real images may not exactly follow the Ising model, we observe
that there are some differences between the theoretical predictions and simulation
results. For the LLR detector, the theory and simulation results agree well, but
for the Hamming distance based detector and Pf > 0.5 region, there is some gap
between the two curves due to the model mismatch.
For the UCID database, we find that the residues in the LS estimate for the
hash and noise parameters are 0.24 and 0.253 respectively, which is around 4 times
that for the panda database. Thus, we expect that the Ising model may not be a good
fit for the fingerprints obtained from this particular database. Figure 4.9(b) shows
that the theoretical predictions and the simulation results for the LLR detector have
a similar trend. The Hamming distance based detector performs much better in the
simulations compared to the theoretical predictions, and there is a large gap. From
these results, we see that while the model mismatch can affect the accuracy of the
theoretical predictions compared to the simulation results, the LLR detector derived
through this analysis can improve the detection accuracy by approximately 5-20%






































Figure 4.8: (a) Correlation among fingerprint and noise components, and (b)
Comparison of theoretical and simulation results for a database consisting of 1000
images obtained from Flickr.
In general, the distribution of the fingerprints depends on the fingerprinting
algorithm and the images in the database. Based on the particular algorithm, a
suitable graphical model may be used for modeling the fingerprint and noise distri-
bution. Given such a graphical model, the LLR detector can be derived and used for
the fingerprint matching. A suitable set of parameters can be defined as the state
and the Wang-Landau algorithm can be used to estimate the density of states. The
density of states estimate can then be used to predict the detection accuracy that





































Figure 4.9: (a) Correlation among fingerprint and noise components, and (b)
Comparison of theoretical and simulation results for UCID images.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter focuses on modeling correlated binary fingerprints and analyzing
their performance under a hypothesis testing framework. We proposed a Markov
Random Field model for the fingerprint and noise bits. Under this model, we exam-
ined fingerprint matching as a hypothesis testing problem and proposed a statistical
physics inspired approach to compute the probabilities of detection and false alarm.
Our analysis showed that Hamming distance based detection, which is commonly
employed in many applications, is suboptimal in this setting and is susceptible to
correlations among the fingerprint bits or the noise. The optimal log-likelihood ratio
detector provides 5− 20% higher detection probability and the performance is rela-
tively stable for different correlations among the fingerprint and noise components.
Simulation results using image databases corroborate our theoretical analysis.
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4.5 Appendix: Wang-Landau Sampling
In statistical physics, the density of states is an important quantity that en-
ables the computation and characterization of various thermodynamic properties
of a physical system. Given a system which may exist in different configurations,
the density of states is defined as the number of configurations that have the same
energy. This quantity is independent of the thermodynamic temperature and once
determined, can be used to compute the properties of the system at any temper-
ature. Traditional MCMC methods, which are used to estimate thermodynamic
properties such as free energy, sample from the distribution over the set of config-
urations, and may not visit states with low probability often enough to allow for
accurate estimation of the density of states. To address this problem, Wang and
Landau [96] proposed a technique for estimating the density of states by performing
a random walk in the energy space. We illustrate the algorithm using an example
of a physical system with spins that can take values ±1.
Suppose we have a system with L spins Xi ∈ {−1,+1}, i = 1, 2, . . . L. Given
a particular configuration of the spins X = [X1 X2 . . . XL] = x ∈ {−1,+1}L, let
the energy of the system be given by Ex(x). We are interested in determining the
density of states g(·) defined as:
g(E) = |{x ∈ {−1,+1}L : Ex(x) = E}|
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. The main idea behind the Wang-Landau
algorithm is to construct a Markov Chain with stationary distribution proportional
to 1
g(E)
. Samples X(1),X(2), . . . ,X(t), . . . are then drawn from this Markov Chain
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and used to estimate g(E).
The Markov Chain is constructed as follows. The initial value of the spinsX(0)
is chosen randomly from {−1,+1}L and an initial value is chosen for the density of
states, e.g. g(E) = 1, ∀E. The number of times that a particular energy value has
been encountered in the simulation is initialized to zero, i.e. count(E) = 0, ∀E, and
the update factor for the density of states estimate χ is set to a moderately large
value, e.g. χ = exp(1). At the tth iteration, a value J(t) uniformly distributed on
{1, 2, . . . , L} is chosen and the sign of XJ(t) is flipped with a certain probability qt
as described next.
Let flipj(x) be the function that flips the sign of the jth element of x, i.e.





which is the ratio of (the current estimates of) the density of states for the energy
of the current state X(t − 1) and the energy of the state that would result if the











flipJ(t)(X(t− 1)) with probability qt
X(t− 1) with probability 1− qt.
It can be verified [96] that the samples X(t) thus obtained form a Markov
Chain with stationary distribution proportional to 1
g(E)
. The count of the energies
encountered and the estimate of the density of states are updated as:
count(Ex(X(t))) ← count(Ex(X(t))) + 1
g(Ex(X(t))) ← g(Ex(X(t)))× χ
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Algorithm 1: Wang-Landau density of states estimation
Initialize: Xi = ±1 randomly, i = 1, 2, . . . , L; χ = exp(1).
g(E) = 1, count(E) = 0, ∀E.
while χ < exp(10−8) do
Choose J uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , L}
κ = g(Ex(X))
g(Ex(flipJ (X)))











−XJ with probability q
XJ with probability 1− q
count(Ex(X))← count(Ex(X)) + 1
g(Ex(X))← g(Ex(X))× χ
if minE count(E) > µ× avg(count(E)) then




Normalize the density of states g(E).
where χ is the update factor.
When all energy values have been encountered equally often, the estimate of
the density of states has an accuracy proportional to ln(χ). If a better accuracy
is desired, the update factor χ is reduced, the counts are reset to zero, and the
iterations are continued. Initially, the update factor χ is chosen to be large enough
so that all the energy levels are visited quickly, and then it is progressively reduced to
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obtain a finer estimate. This process is continued until χ becomes small enough, e.g.
χ < exp(10−8). The g(E) obtained after convergence is relative and is normalized
to obtain an estimate of the density of states. The algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 1, where we have dropped the dependence of the variables on the iteration
number t for notational convenience and presented in-place operations instead.
The above algorithm was described in the context of estimating the density of
energy states. In some applications, multiple parameters of the system may be of in-
terest, e.g. the energy Ex(x) and the magnetization Mx(x) =
∑
i xi. The state may
then be defined to consist of these multiple parameters: s = S(x) = (Ex(x),Mx(x)).
The corresponding density of states g(s) can be estimated by performing the random






For large systems, the parameter space can be divided into several regions and
independent random walks can be performed over each of these regions for faster
convergence. The overall density of states can then be reconstructed from these
individual estimates by ensuring continuity at the boundaries. For further details
regarding the algorithm, please see [96].
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4.6 Appendix: Least Square Estimation of MRF Parame-
ters
For the MRF model, as the partition function Z depends on the parameters
in a complicated manner, direct Maximum Likelihood estimation of the parameters
given sample data is typically difficult. Instead, various techniques such as pseudo-
likelihood [8] and Least Square (LS) based estimation [23] are often used to estimate
the parameters. For the Ising model, both these techniques turn out to be equivalent.
In this appendix, we briefly summarize the Least Square(LS) estimation of the MRF
model parameters described in [23], which we use in our experiments.
Consider a particular node Xi in the MRF and denote the set of neighbors of
Xi by Ni. Due to the Markov property of the MRF, the conditional distribution of
Xi given all the remaining nodes depends only on the values of its neighbors. For
the specific energy function defined in Eqn. (4.1), we have:











Pr(Xi = +1| XNi)
Pr(Xi = −1| XNi)




The quantity on the left hand side of Eqn. (4.9) may be estimated from the samples
of the MRF distribution by counting the number of occurrences of Xi = +1 and
−1 for different values of the neighbors XNi. This yields a set of equations in ν
and η that can be solved using the least squares technique to obtain an estimate of
the parameters of the MRF model. The parameters α and γ for the noise can be
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In the previous two chapters, we have developed models for binary fingerprints
and analyzed their performance. We first examined i.i.d. fingerprints with equally
likely bits in Chapter 3. As practical algorithms generate fingerprints with corre-
lated components, we proposed an MRF model for binary fingerprints in Chapter 4
that can capture these correlations. The MRF model was mainly described in the
context of modeling the components of the fingerprint of a single frame, which can be
considered to be spatial correlations. Practical fingerprints also exhibit correlations
in the temporal direction. Fig. 5.1 shows the 512 successive fingerprints for a 100s
long video sequence obtained using the algorithm described in [64]. Each column in
the image represents the 32 bit fingerprint corresponding to one frame, with a white
pixel representing the bit value ‘1’ and a black value indicating ‘0’. From the figure,
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Figure 5.1: Example of temporal correlations among fingerprints from 512 succes-
sive frames for a 100s video using the algorithm in [64].
we observe that fingerprint values change slowly over time and exhibit correlations.
The MRF model proposed in the previous chapter can be used to model such
correlations. As the number of states grows polynomially with the number of nodes
in the model, the associated computational approach for estimating the detection
accuracy may not be scale very well if the number of nodes becomes very large. To
address this problem, in this chapter we examine various models for capturing such
temporal correlations. Using detectors derived based on these models, we improve
the accuracy of identifying matching content.
We model the temporal relations between fingerprints using a Markov chain in
Section 5.1, and evaluate the suitability of this model using a database of videos in
Section 5.2. As the experimental results indicate that the MC model is suitable only
in a certain regime, we examine hybrid models for the fingerprints and corresponding
detectors in Section 5.3.
5.1 Markov Chain based model for temporal correlations
In practical applications involving large databases, to reduce the complexity
of the matching process, a coarse search of the database is first performed using the
query fingerprint to identify likely matches. Approximate search techniques such as
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Locality Sensitive Hashing [29] are typically used for this purpose. Once this reduced
set of candidates is obtained, a more detailed matching is carried out to identify
the most likely match. In this chapter, we focus only on the finer matching and
describe a model for the matching process that explicitly accounts for correlations
among fingerprint components.
In many practical schemes, fingerprints for a long multimedia sequence are ob-
tained by concatenating the sub-fingerprints obtained from shorter sub-sequences [64].
We will refer to such a unit from which one sub-fingerprint is computed as a
“frame”. In some video fingerprinting schemes, this abstract frame may corre-
spond to a single physical frame, whereas in others, it may correspond to a group
of frames. Let y(j) represent the sub-fingerprint of the jth frame of the query and
Y = [y(1) y(2) . . . y(L)] denote the overall fingerprint of the query. Similarly, let
X = [x(1) x(2) . . . x(L)] be the fingerprint of a candidate video in the database.
We model the fingerprint matching as a hypothesis test [88] and consider the
binary hypothesis test to determine whether the query fingerprint Y matches with
fingerprint X. The null hypothesis H0 corresponds to the case where X and Y do
not match, whereas the alternative hypothesis H1 corresponds to the case where X is
a match for Y. The overall matching procedure may be considered as a sequence of
such binary hypothesis tests whose results are combined to obtain the final decision.
To characterize this hypothesis test, we require the joint distribution p′i(X,Y) =
qi(Y|X) q′(X), i = 0, 1 under the two hypotheses. Here qi(Y|X) represents the
conditional distribution of the query Y given the reference X under Hi and q
′(X)
is the marginal distribution of X. However, as X and Y have high dimension,
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obtaining the joint distribution is not feasible in practice and alternative approaches
are needed.









only depends on the conditional distributions q′0, q
′
1 of Y given X under the two
hypotheses. Obtaining this conditional distribution still suffers from the problem of
high dimensionality. To allow for practical modeling, we assume that the conditional
distribution only depends on the distance between the fingerprints. This assumption
is motivated by the use of simple distance based matching in practical applications
and its good performance.
Let d(X,Y) = [d(1) d(2) . . . d(L)]T , be the vector of distances between the
fingerprints X and Y, where d(j) = d(x(j),y(j)) is the distance between the jth
sub-fingerprint of the query and the reference obtained using a suitable distance
metric. To capture the temporal correlations in the video frames that are reflected
in the fingerprints, we model the sequence of distances {d(j)} as following a Markov
chain distribution with transition probability matrix Pi under hypothesis Hi [92]:




P0(d(j − 1), d(j))




P1(d(j − 1), d(j)),
where Pi(k, l) = Pr(d(j) = l | d(j − 1) = k,Hi) represents the probability of tran-
sitioning from state k to state l for the Markov chain and πi is the corresponding
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P1(d(j − 1), d(j))





where τ is an appropriately chosen threshold. The above Markov chain based model
may be applied to any fingerprinting scheme with the associated distance metric.













If all the fingerprint bits are i.i.d. and equally likely to be ‘0’ or ‘1’, and the noise
operates in a similar manner, then the Hamming distance based detector is optimal,
as shown in Section 3.2. In practice, this detector is usually preferred due to its
low computational complexity and ease of implementation. In the next section, we
compare the detection accuracy of these detectors using a practical fingerprinting
scheme and a video database.
5.2 Experimental Results
In our experiments, we use the video fingerprinting scheme proposed in [64].
The frame rate of the video is normalized by downsampling to 5 fps and a 32-bit
fingerprint is computed for every frame of the video. The MUSCLE-VCD-2007
database [47] is used for estimating the detection accuracy. The database consists
of 101 videos with a total duration of approximately 100 hours. Half the videos are




















Figure 5.2: Comparison of the transition matrices under the two hypotheses.
fold cross-validation [43] and average the identification results obtained from each
of these individual runs.
5.2.1 Estimating the transition matrices
Histogram equalization is used as an example of the processing that may be
encountered in a practical system. Other distortions can be treated similarly. The
observed distances between the fingerprints of the distorted and reference videos
are used to estimate the transition probability matrix P1 under hypothesis H1.
Similarly, the distances between the fingerprints of every pair of videos in the training
set is used to estimate P0.
Figure 5.2 compares the transition matrices obtained when the first 50 movies
are used for training. These transition matrices reveal the correlated nature of
the distances between the sub-fingerprints of adjacent frames. The strong diagonal
component in both the transition matrices indicates that the value of d(j) is very
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Figure 5.3: Stationary distribution of the distances under the two hypotheses.
likely to be close to d(j−1). As large distances are not observed frequently under H1,
the probability of d(j) given that d(j− 1) is a large value is approximately uniform,
as seen by the last several rows of P1 in Figure 5.2(a). On the other hand, under
H0, large values are observed frequently enough to obtain an accurate estimate of
the transition probability, as depicted in Figure 5.2(b).
Figure 5.3 shows the stationary distributions under the two hypotheses. From
the figure, we see that under the null hypothesis H0, the distribution resembles a
binomial distribution centered at 16. Under H1, the distances are clustered around
4 − 5 and the distribution is non-binomial. This indicates that the noise within a
given frame is possibly correlated. This is to be expected, since histogram equaliza-






























(a) ROC (log-log scale)









































(c) Low Pm region
Figure 5.4: Comparison of the detection performance of the Markov Chain LLR
detector and the average Hamming distance detector for query video size of 100
frames (a) Complete ROC curve in log-log scale (b) Low Pf region and (c) Low Pm
region.
5.2.2 Detection Accuracy
We use the 50 videos in the testing set to compare the detection accuracy of the
likelihood ratio and the average distance based detectors. Each video is distorted by
applying histogram equalization and divided into distinct queries of 20s each with
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100 sub-fingerprints. These are compared with the original undistorted fingerprints
to estimate the probability of missed detection Pm. To estimate the probability
of false alarm Pf , each video in the testing set is divided into queries of 100 sub-
fingerprints each and compared with the fingerprints of every other video in the
database. The Pm and Pf values obtained are averaged over the different iterations
of the k-fold cross-validation.
Figure 5.4 compares the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for
the Markov chain likelihood ratio and the average distance based detectors. Fig-
ure 5.4(a) shows Pm as a function of Pf for both detectors on a logarithmic scale.
From the figure, we observe that the likelihood ratio based detector has lower Pm
in the low Pf region, whereas the average distance based detector performs better
in the low Pm region. Upon closer examination of the low Pf region, as shown in
Figure 5.4(b), we observe that the LR detector has approximately 5 − 10% lower
Pm than the average distance based detector. In the low Pm region shown in Fig-
ure 5.4(c), the average distance based detector has a similar improvement.
5.3 Mixture and Adaptive Models
In the previous section, we have seen that the Markov chain is a better model
for the distances in the low Pf regime, which corresponds to the case when the
average distance is small. In the low Pm regime, an independent model for the
distances is a better fit. This motivates us to explore the use of mixture models
for the distances to achieve a better performance in both regimes. The first model
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we consider is a mixture model where the components of the mixture are a Markov
chain like distribution and an independent model. Then, we consider a variation
of this mixture model, where instead of assigning prior probabilities based on the
training data, we adaptively choose the underlying mixture component based on the
observation.
5.3.1 Mixture Model
In this section, we describe a mixture model [9, 57] for the distances between
the query and reference fingerprint. The components of the mixture are chosen to be
a Markov-Chain like distribution and an independent model. We introduce latent
variables z = [z1 z2]
T ∈ {[1 0]T , [0 1]T} to denote the component from which the
observation is drawn. Only one of z1 and z2 is equal to 1 and the other variable
is 0, which corresponds to the 1-of-K coding scheme [9]. Under hypothesis Hi, the
probability distribution of the distances d given the latent variable z(i) is given by:




Pi(d(j − 1), d(j))





where in the second component, the distances are assumed to be i.i.d. with a
common distribution qi under Hi. In the above expressions, the parameters of
the model Θ(i) consists of the transition matrix Pi, the corresponding stationary
distribution πi and the common distribution qi. The prior probabilities of each of
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the components is given as:
Pr(z(i) = [1 0]T |Hi) = α(i)1
Pr(z(i) = [0 1]T |Hi) = α(i)2
Given the training data, the parameters of the models can be estimated using the
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [22, 58]. The details of the EM algo-
rithm for this model are provided as appendix in Section 5.5. Using the estimated
parameters, the log-likelihood ratio corresponding to this mixture model is used to
identify whether the query fingerprint is a match to the reference fingerprint or not.
Experimental Results
As before, we evaluate the appropriateness of this model using the MUSCLE-
VCD database. 50 videos are randomly selected and used for training while the
remaining are used for testing. This procedure is repeated 10 times and the results
are averaged. Figure 5.5 compares the performance of the detector based on this
mixture model with the detectors based on the Markov chain model and the average
distance. From the figure, we observe that the performance of the mixture-model
based detector very closely follows that of the Markov chain based detector. To
understand this behavior, we examined the parameters estimated for each of the
distributions during the training process. Under both hypotheses, we found that
the prior probabilities of the Markov chain component α
(i)
1 ≥ 0.9 implying that
the contribution from the Markov chain component dominates the likelihood of the



























Figure 5.5: Comparison of the detectors based on the mixture model, Markov-
Chain model, and the average distance.
very small. As a result, the performance of the mixture model is similar to that of
the Markov chain model.
5.3.2 Adaptive Model
Based on the analysis and discussion in the previous subsection, we see that
merely relying on the prior probabilities of the mixture components results in the
likelihood being dominated by the Markov chain component. Further, the charac-
teristics of the observation are not utilized in choosing the mixture component or
equivalently, the values of the latent variables. To remedy this problem, we propose
a different approach to estimate the value of the latent variable, and then utilize the
estimated value to make a decision in the hypothesis test.
We use the average distance d̄ as a parameter to guide us in choosing the ap-
propriate model. If d̄ ≥ d0, we use the LLR detector based on the i.i.d. distribution,
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[0 1] if d̄ ≥ d0
[1 0] if d̄ < d0
Under this setting, the model for the distribution of the distances becomes:




Pi(d(j − 1), d(j))



























τA2 if d̄ ≥ d0.
(5.3)
Thus, the detector adaptively chooses between the Markov chain and independent
model based decision rules depending on the average distance of the observations.
We will refer to the detector that utilizes this decision rule as the adaptive detector.
The parameter d0 can be estimated by evaluating the performance of the adaptive
detector using the training set and choosing the value that results in the best per-
formance. In practice, we found that the performance is not very sensitive to the
value of d0, and that a value 0.25 dmax ≤ d0 ≤ 0.35 dmax, where dmax = 32 is the
maximum possible distance between two sub-fingerprints provides a good detection
accuracy. In our experiments, we use the value of d0 = 0.25 dmax = 8.
As the decision thresholds (τA1 , τ
A
2 ) vary, different tradeoffs between Pm and


























































(b) Low Pf region
Figure 5.6: ROC curves for the various detectors.
the Markov chain LR, the mixture model based and the average distance based
detectors on a logarithmic scale. As expected, we see that the adaptive detector
performs better than or comparable to the other detectors for all values of Pm and




In practical applications, the computational complexity of the detectors is also
an important parameter. The average distance based detector requires O(L) oper-
ations for computing the average distance, which is then compared to a threshold.
The adaptive detector utilizes the average distance and the number of transitions
between the various states, which can both be computed with one pass over the
data requiring O(L) operations. The individual likelihood ratios that appear in the
decision rule, may be pre-computed and stored, so that computing the appropriate
detection statistic requires at most an additional O(L) operations. The overall com-
plexity is still O(L), implying that the adaptive detector based on this model is only
slightly more expensive compared to the simple average distance based detector.
5.3.3 Model Evaluation using Information Criteria
In the previous section, we have seen that the adaptive model gives the best
performance in both the low Pf and low Pm regimes. As the adaptive model is a
more complicated model compared to the Markov chain model, there is a danger
that the model is overfitting the available data. Typically, when various models
are available for fitting the data distribution, various information criteria, such as
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [1] or the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) [38, 72] are used to evaluate the tradeoff between model complexity and the
better fitting capability of a more complex model. In this subsection, we use these
information criteria to compare the adaptive model and the Markov chain model.
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The AIC is defined as:
AIC = ln p(D|ΘML)−Np,
where D is the set of available observations, ΘML is the ML estimate of the model
parameters, and Np is the number of parameters in the model. A Bayesian approach
was adopted in [37, 72] to derive a related information criterion called the BIC:
BIC = ln p(D|ΘML)−Np lnM,
whereM is the number of training samples available. Compared to the AIC, the BIC
has a higher penalty for the model complexity in terms of the number of parameters.
For the Markov chain model, we estimate the transition matrix from the train-
ing data. As the Hamming distance between any two sub-fingerprints can take val-
ues from 0 to dmax = 32, there are (dmax + 1) states in the Markov chain and the
transition matrix is of size (dmax + 1) × (dmax + 1). As the transition matrix is
stochastic, implying that the sum of each row equals 1, only dmax entries in each
row are independent. Thus, the number of parameters for the Markov chain model
Np = (dmax + 1)dmax. For the adaptive model, we have (dmax + 1)dmax parameters
for the transition matrix, dmax parameters for the independent distribution, and an
additional parameter d0, so that the total number of parameters Np = (dmax + 1)
2.
Figure 5.7 compares the values of the AIC and BIC for the Markov Chain
and adaptive models using the training data under the two hypotheses. From the
figure, we observe that the Markov chain model has a slightly higher value for both
the information criteria. The adaptive model has a 6% lower BIC under the H1



































Figure 5.7: Evaluation of AIC and BIC for Markov chain and adaptive models
using training data under the two hypotheses.
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from this perspective, the adaptive model is slightly worse compared to the Markov
chain model. However, as shown via the experimental results in Section 5.3.2, the
adaptive model is better at discriminating between the two hypothesis.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we developed models for temporal correlations in fingerprints.
We first explored the use of a Markov chain to model the distribution of the dis-
tances between the query and reference fingerprints. Fingerprint matching was then
considered as a hypothesis test and the optimal likelihood ratio based detector based
on this Markov chain model was derived. Experimental results indicated that the
Markov chain model is a good fit only for a certain part of the distribution, and
an independent model may be a better fit in other regimes. Motivated by this ob-
servation, we proposed a hybrid model for the fingerprints and derived an adaptive
detector that performs better than or comparable to the Markov chain and average
distance based detectors. While this adaptive model has 5 − 10% lower values for
the model information criteria, the corresponding adaptive detector provides ap-
proximately 5− 10% lower Pm in the low Pf regime without significantly increasing
the computational cost.
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5.5 Appendix: EM Algorithm for the Mixture Model
In this appendix, we derive the Expectation-Maximization algorithm for es-
timating the parameters of the mixture model described in Section 5.3.1. The pa-
rameters for the model under H1 and H0 hypothesis are estimated separately using
the corresponding sets of training data. As the model for the data under both
hypotheses is the same, the steps involved in estimating the parameters are also
identical. Below, we drop the explicit conditioning on the hypothesis Hi to simplify
the notation.
Suppose that we have training data D = [d1 d2 . . . dM ], where each di
consists of L components and M is the size of the training set so that D is an
L ×M matrix. Let the corresponding latent variables for each observation in the
training data be represented by the matrix Z = [z1 z2 . . . zM ]. As each zi is a
vector of size 2 × 1, Z has size 2 ×M . Denote the parameters for each component
in the mixture model by θk which are to be estimated from the training data and
let p(d | zk = 1, θk) , pk(d | θk).
The joint distribution of an observation and the corresponding latent variables
can be written as:




(αkpk(d | θk))zk ,








(αkpk(dm | θk))Zkm , (5.4)
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5.5.1 E-step
For the E-step, we need to compute the expectation of ln p(D,Z |Θ) under
the distribution p(Z |D,Θ). Using Eqn. (5.4), we have:







Ep(Z |D,Θ)[Zkm] (lnαk + ln pk(dm | θk)) . (5.5)
We now need to evaluate Ep(Z |D,Θ)[Zkm]. As each column in Z is independent, we



















Since zm can take only two values [1 0]




k=1 αkpk(d | θk)
= γ(Zkm),
which allows us to compute the desired quantity in Eqn (5.5) and complete the E-
step of the EM algorithm. The quantities γ(Zkm) are called the “responsibilities” as
they indicate the responsibility for the mth observation taken by the kth component
of the mixture model [9].
5.5.2 M-step
In the M-step of the algorithm, we choose the parameters Θ that maximize
the expectation Ep(Z |D,Θ)[ln p(D,Z |Θ)] obtained in the E-step of the algorithm
and shown in Eqn (5.5).
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First, consider the prior probabilities αk. As the prior probabilities should






















m=1 γ(Zkm). Using the condition that
∑2










Next, we estimate the parameters for each of the individual mixture compo-
nents. For the Markov chain component, the parameter θ1 to be estimated cor-
responds to the transition matrix P. The log-likelihood under this component is
given as ln p1(d | θ1) = ln π(d(1))+
∑L
j=2 lnP (d(j− 1), d(j)). Let N(i, j) denote the
number of transitions from state i to j, so that the log-likelihood can be written
in terms of the N(i, j) as ln p1(d | θ1) = ln π(d(1)) +
∑
(i,j)N(i, j) lnP (i, j). While
estimating the P (i, j), we also have the constraint
∑
j P (i, j) = 1, ∀i. We construct












P (i, j)− 1
)
.
Substituting the expression of the log-likelihood into the above Lagrangian, dif-
ferentiating with respect to P (i, j), equating the derivative to 0, and utilizing the
normalization constraint, we obtain:









For the independent distribution component, the parameter θ2 to be estimated
corresponds to the common distribution q. The log-likelihood under this compo-
nent is ln p2(d | θ2) =
∑L
i=1 ln q(d(i)). Let Nj denote the number of occurrences
of the value j in d, so that the log-likelihood can be expressed as ln p2(d | θ2) =
∑
j Nj ln q(d(i)). Using the constraint
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The E-step and M-steps are performed alternately until the value of the objec-
tive function does not change much to obtain the final estimates of the parameters





Content fingerprinting, which was studied in the previous chapters, relies on
the intrinsic characteristics of multimedia to identify and filter them. It can be
used to prevent the redistribution of multimedia via UGC websites and peer-to-
peer networks. On the other hand, collusion-resistant fingerprinting is a proactive
technique employed to deter multimedia piracy and prevent the leak of classified
information. In each authorized copy of the multimedia, a unique signal is embedded
that identifies the recipient. This embedded fingerprint can be extracted from a
pirated copy and used to trace the user responsible for the leak.
As this fingerprint is unique to each recipient, a group of malicious users can
collaborate to launch collusion attacks on the system. By comparing their individual
fingerprinted copies, the colluders can attempt to identify the locations of the em-
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bedded fingerprint and remove them. Various collusion-resistant fingerprint designs
have been proposed in the literature and are summarized in Section 6.1. Most of
these techniques have been developed for protecting uncompressed multimedia. In
many practical applications, multimedia is utilized in a compressed format, where
it is necessary to embed fingerprints into compressed multimedia.
One representative application scenario is an online music/video store that
wishes to deter illicit redistribution of the content purchased from the store. Primar-
ily based on proprietary security protocols and data formats, most existing Digital
Rights Management (DRM) [50] techniques are not interoperable between devices
from different vendors and often restrict the freedom of the users to play the content
on the device of their choice [42]. Further, if the protection provided by the DRM
technique is circumvented, the user can redistribute the content without fear of be-
ing apprehended. Embedding imperceptible fingerprints, on the other hand, does
not restrict content to be packaged in any proprietary format. It is thus interoper-
able and can be incorporated into existing systems to complement other protection
techniques. For an online store to deploy fingerprinting to protect its multimedia
content, the fingerprints should be embedded in the source audio or video files that
are typically stored in compressed form to conserve storage space. When a user
purchases a particular content, a unique fingerprint is embedded in the host audio
or video signal and this fingerprinted signal is then transmitted to the user over
the internet in compressed form to conserve bandwidth. As it is possible for users
to gather multiple fingerprinted versions of the same content and apply collusion












Figure 6.1: Digital TV distribution scenario where the host signal to be finger-
printed is compressed.
highlights the necessity of collusion resistant fingerprint design for compressed mul-
timedia.
Another representative application scenario is shown in Figure 6.1. A digital
TV service provider delivers compressed video to millions of subscribers. The video
is compressed to meet bandwidth requirements and may be further encrypted to
prevent unauthorized users from viewing the content. At the viewer’s end, a set-
top box decrypts, decompresses, and then displays the video stream. The video
output of the set-top box may be intercepted by a malicious user who can then
rebroadcast or resell the content for profit. Digital fingerprinting can be employed
to deter and trace these adversaries [34]. If the fingerprint embedding is performed
at the source (TV service provider), a unique stream would have to be transmitted
to each user. The amount of bandwidth required for this scheme would be several
orders of magnitude higher than broadcasting a single stream to all users. The
bandwidth consumption can be reduced by employing coding techniques to reduce
the number of different versions of the content that need to be transmitted [33,105],
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but would still be several times the amount of bandwidth required to transmit just
one stream. An attractive alternative is to embed the fingerprints at the set-top
box, which has already been secured and tamper-proofed for performing decryption.
This post-distribution fingerprinting approach requires only a single transmission of
the host video to all users. In this case, the set-top box would have to embed a
fingerprint in the host stream that has been previously compressed. In order to
combat adversaries who may store the video output of the set-top box and then
collude to remove traces of their fingerprints before redistributing the content, the
fingerprints embedded should be robust against collusion attacks.
6.1 Related Prior work
Collusion-resistant fingerprint design has been an active research topic for sev-
eral years. A systematic binary fingerprint construction technique for generic data
was proposed by Boneh and Shaw in [10] using an inner staircase code and a random
outer code. The Boneh-Shaw code relied on the “marking assumption” that a group
of colluders could only modify those parts of the content in which their copies dif-
fered. A fingerprinting code construction based on a relaxed version of the marking
assumption and optimal in the code length was described in [79]. The marking as-
sumption may not be valid for multimedia data, as the attackers can also modify the
parts of the content containing undetectable bits, where their copies are the same,
without causing significant perceptual degradation. These fingerprinting codes are
usually adapted for multimedia fingerprinting by combining the codes with a finger-
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print embedding layer. A fingerprinting scheme for multimedia data based on the
Boneh-Shaw code and using a Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum embedding layer
was proposed in [104] under a relaxed assumption that allowed modification of the
undetectable bits. The code length of this scheme is high, limiting its feasibility in
practical applications. Fingerprinting constructions based on q-ary Error-Correcting
Codes (ECC) were proposed in [70] with tolerance towards erasures and cropping.
This work did not explicitly consider embedding issues and used an abstract as-
sumption to model the underlying embedding scheme. Other fingerprinting codes
based on ECC and their properties were examined in [4]. Based on the robust
spread-spectrum watermark embedding scheme by Cox et al. [17], a fingerprinting
technique for multimedia content was proposed in [83] employing a combinatorial
construction and orthogonal spreading sequences for modulation. Fingerprinting
based on Quantization Index Modulation [11] was also explored in [77]. Multimedia
fingerprint embedding techniques proposed in the literature so far, such as [17, 77],
were primarily designed for fingerprinting uncompressed signals.
Information theoretical aspects of fingerprinting have been investigated by
modelling fingerprinting as communications with side information [18]. Capacity
expressions for fingerprinting signals with finite alphabets [75] and continuous alpha-
bets have been derived [97]. Recently, a capacity achieving universal fingerprinting
code has been proposed in [61], where the detector is not required to have knowledge
of either the collusion attack or the number of colluders. These theoretical results
guarantee the existence of good fingerprinting codes, but often require decoding
schemes with high computational complexity and may not be suitable for practical
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implementations.
Another body of related literature addresses the problem of watermarking
compressed signals. A few robust watermarking techniques for compressed signals
have been proposed. Watermarks can be embedded in a compressed video stream
by adding the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients of a watermark to the
quantized DCT coefficients of the compressed host signal followed by re-encoding of
the watermarked signal [31]. Another approach embeds watermarks by selectively
discarding high-frequency DCT coefficients in certain regions of the image [45].
These techniques were not designed for fingerprinting applications and thus have
limited collusion resistance.
Chapter Contributions
One of the reasons that fingerprinting compressed signals has not received
much attention is perhaps the implicit belief in the robustness of the underlying
embedding technique. Indeed, individual spread spectrum fingerprints embedded in
uncompressed hosts are robust enough to survive strong compression [17]. However,
as will be shown in this chapter, if the fingerprint is to be embedded in a compressed
host signal and the fingerprinted result also has to be stored in compressed form, the
corresponding fingerprint components for different users can only take values from
a small, discrete set, making the system vulnerable to collusion. To address this
problem, we describe a new technique called Anti-Collusion Dithering to overcome



























Figure 6.2: System model for compressed domain fingerprinting.
as theoretical analyses based on probability, estimation, and information theories,
we will show that almost the same level of collusion resistance can be achieved when
applying Anti-Collusion Dithered fingerprinting to compressed host signals as that
obtained when fingerprinting uncompressed hosts.
Section 6.2 describes the system model for fingerprinting compressed signals.
Section 6.3 examines the collusion resistance of quantized Gaussian fingerprints
through simulations. Anti-Collusion Dithering technique is then proposed in Section
6.4 to improve the collusion resistance of the fingerprints. Theoretical analysis of
fingerprinting techniques for compressed multimedia will be considered in Chapter 7.
6.2 System Model
Figure 6.2 depicts the system model for compressed domain fingerprinting. Let
S = [S1, S2, . . . , SM ] represent the compressed host signal of lengthM . For example,
in the case of image or video fingerprinting, the host samples could correspond to
the 8× 8 block DCT coefficients that are widely adopted in image and video coding
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standards. For simplicity, we consider the vector S as comprising of elements from
one frequency channel after compression, and model the compression of the host
signal as a uniform quantization operation with step size ∆, so that Sj = m∆,
where m = 0,±1,±2, . . . The analysis can be extended to the case of a host signal
comprising of elements with different quantization step sizes by grouping samples
with similar quantization as one channel.
A fingerprint is embedded in the compressed host signal S to obtain the fin-
gerprinted signal for each of the N users. The fingerprinted signal for the kth user,
X(k), is quantized with step size ∆e, i.e. for each signal component, X
(k)
j = m∆e.
The value of ∆e represents the compression of the fingerprinted signal and is chosen
by the embedder to achieve a tradeoff between perceptual distortion and band-
width consumption. If ∆e < ∆, the bandwidth required to transmit the finger-
printed signal may increase compared to the host signal before fingerprinting. Al-
ternatively, choosing ∆e > ∆ may result in further perceptual distortion. Thus,
a reasonable choice for the embedder is to set ∆e = ∆. The fingerprinted sig-





2 , . . . ,W
(k)
M ] represents the k
th user’s fingerprint. The energy of
the fingerprint is chosen such that the distortion introduced by embedding does not
cause visual artifacts. We quantify the distortion using the Mean Squared Error
(MSE) and express the distortion constraint as:
E[‖S−X(k)‖2] ≤ M ·D(∆), ∀k = 1, 2, . . . , N, (6.1)
where D(∆) is the maximum allowed squared distortion per sample, given the quan-
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tization step size ∆.
6.2.1 Collusion Attacks
A group of K malicious users UK , may mount collusion attacks and attempt
to create a copy V that does not contain traces of their fingerprints. The colluders
can re-compress the attacked signal for ease of redistribution and to further remove
traces of their fingerprints. Suppose the attackers compress the colluded signal by
quantizing it with step size ∆c so that Vj = m∆c. The attackers’ choice of ∆c
is affected by the value of ∆. Since the fingerprinted signal has previously been
quantized with step size ∆, by choosing ∆c < ∆ the colluders would not improve
the perceptual quality of the attacked signal. Applying milder quantization would
not only lead to increased bandwidth requirements for the colluded copy, but also
favor the survival of fingerprints, resulting in a higher probability for at least one
of the colluders to be caught. On the other hand, choosing ∆c > ∆ would further
reduce the perceptual quality of the colluded signal. A reasonable compromise for
the attacker would be to choose ∆c = ∆, which we will examine in the following
section. The case of ∆c 6= ∆ will be examined later in Section 6.4.3.
The jth sample of the colluded version Vj is obtained as Vj = g({X(k)j }k∈UK),
where g(·) is a suitable collusion function. Several linear and nonlinear collusion
attacks have been studied in [106] for Gaussian based independent fingerprints for
uncompressed host signals. We extend these attacks to compressed signals by adding
quantization, and examine their effectiveness against the fingerprinting system. The
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Minimum : Vminj = min({X(k)j }k∈UK),
Maximum : Vmaxj = max({X(k)j }k∈UK),














j − Vmedj ,










Vminj with probability 0.5
Vmaxj with probability 0.5
(6.2)
where round(·) denotes rounding to the nearest integer. Further processing, such as
addition of noise and filtering, may be applied to the colluded signal. For simplicity,
we model these operations as additive white Gaussian noise n, with zero mean and
variance σ2 to obtain Z = V + n, as shown in Figure 3.1. It is also possible to
consider the case where the noise n is quantized, but our experiments have shown
that there is no significant difference in the results when the noise n is quantized,
as the noise mainly serves to confuse the detector. Henceforth, we will restrict our
attention to the case where n is a (continuous-valued) zero-mean white Gaussian
noise vector.
Another attack that the colluders can mount is the random attack. The at-
tackers first estimate the dynamic range of the fingerprinted signal, i.e. Xminj and
1This attack corresponds to the randomized negative attack examined in [106].
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Xmaxj such that, for all k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N ,
Xminj ≤ X(k)j ≤ Xmaxj .
Since the values of Xminj and X
max
j are typically chosen by the fingerprint em-
bedder to ensure that no perceptual distortion is introduced by the embedding, the





introducing perceptual distortion. This attack may be modelled as the Min-Max
attack plus additional noise and hence will not be treated separately in this work.
6.2.2 Colluder Detection
For detection, we focus our attention on the problem of identifying one of
the adversaries who have contributed to a colluded signal under question, known
as the “Catch One” case [98]. The analysis can be extended to other cases such
as “Catch More” or “Catch All”, by properly adjusting the form of the detector
and the corresponding threshold and evaluation criteria [98]. Since the host signal
S is usually available to the detector in fingerprinting applications, the detector
first performs registration and subsequently removes the interference from the host
signal S, by subtracting it from the attacked signal Z to obtain Y = Z − S. The
detector then applies preprocessing to remove any non-zero mean. We follow the
method in [106] to preprocess the test signal and center the histogram of the test
signal around zero. If a single non-zero sample mean is observed, such as that
observed in the case of minimum or maximum attacks, shown in Figure 6.3(a) and
(b), it is subtracted to obtain a zero mean signal, Y ′j = Yj − (
∑M
j=1 Yj)/M . If a
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Figure 6.3: Histograms of extracted fingerprints Y for (a) Minimum, (b) Maxi-
mum, and (c) Randomized Min-Max Attacks.
bi-modal distribution is observed, as in the case of a randomized min-max attack
(Figure 6.3 (c)), the fingerprint components are clustered into two distributions
and the corresponding mean is subtracted for each distribution. Specifically, define
µneg = (
∑M
j=1 Yj.1{Yj < 0})/(
∑M
j=1 1{Yj < 0}) and µpos = (
∑M
j=1 Yj.1{Yj >
0})/(∑Mj=1 1{Yj > 0}), where 1{·} is an indicator function. The preprocessing








Yj − µneg if Yj < 0
Yj − µpos if Yj > 0
.
The detector then correlates the test signal Y′ with each of the fingerprints





The user q whose fingerprint has the maximum correlation with the extracted test
signal is declared guilty:




Gaussian based spread spectrum fingerprints have been shown to be effective
against collusion attacks on uncompressed host signals [76,106] and have also served
as an embedding layer for adapting systematic fingerprint construction techniques
to multimedia fingerprinting [33, 83]. The Gaussian distribution has been shown
to be the optimal distribution for uncompressed multimedia fingerprints under a
wide variety of attacks [41]. Hence, we first examine the performance of Gaussian
fingerprints when fingerprinting compressed multimedia signals in the next section.
6.3 Evaluation of Quantized Gaussian Fingerprints
In this section, we evaluate the collusion resistance when using Gaussian based
independent signals as fingerprints for compressed host signals. In the embedding
stage, watermark components W
(k)
j are generated by quantizing independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with









×∆, where Q(k)j is a zero mean Gaussian random
variable. These watermark sequences are then embedded into the host signal to
obtain the fingerprinted signal. The variance of the Gaussian random variable Q
(k)
j
is chosen such that the fingerprinted signal satisfies the distortion constraint in Eqn.
(6.1). For the attacks, we first concentrate on the case ∆c = ∆, where the attackers
use the original quantization step size of the host signal to compress the colluded
signal, and consider the case ∆c 6= ∆ in Section 6.4.3. Guilty users are identified
using the correlation based detector in Eqn. (6.4).
In our experiments, we focus on one frequency channel in the block DCT do-
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main, and the results can be extended to the multi-channel case. Since the host
signal, fingerprint signal, and colluded signal are all quantized with the same quan-
tization step size ∆, and the host signal is subtracted from the colluded signal before
detection, the distribution of the detection statistics is independent of the host, as
will be shown in Section 7.1. Thus, the simulation results obtained are independent
of the host distribution. We consider a system with N = 1024 users, and choose
the fingerprint length M = 104 which is the approximate number of coefficients in a
256 × 256 natural grayscale image that can be used for embedding the fingerprint.
The maximum allowed squared distortion, D(∆) is set to 15, which results in a
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) of around 36dB if every DCT coefficient were
to be used for embedding with the same maximum allowed distortion. We test the
performance of the system for ∆ = 6, 4, and 1 which correspond to quantization
step sizes for the AC11 band in the JPEG table for quality factors of 75, 85, and 95,
respectively. A quality factor of 75 is the default in many applications as it generally
provides a good tradeoff between signal quality and bit rate. Quality factors larger
than 75 are typically used in applications that demand high quality and hence we
investigate the performance under these settings.
Figure 6.4 shows the probability of catching one colluder, Pd, versus the num-
ber of colluders for various collusion attacks. In each case, the additive noise power
is set to be comparable to the fingerprint power, i.e., Watermark-to-Noise Ratio
(WNR) = 0dB, but the overall distortion between the attacked image and the com-
pressed host image would depend on the distortion introduced by the corresponding
attack. Figure 6.4(a) shows Pd when ∆ = 1 under averaging, median, minimum
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(a) ∆ = 1 (b) ∆ = 6
Figure 6.4: Probability of catching one colluder using quantized Gaussian finger-
prints at WNR = 0dB, N = 1024 users, M = 104, D(∆) = 15 for (a) ∆ = 1 and (b)
∆ = 6.
and randomized min-max attacks, and Figure 6.4(b) shows the corresponding re-
sults for ∆ = 6. From Figure 6.4(a), we see that for ∆ = 1, we have approximately
100% detection against the examined attacks when the number of colluders is less
than 30, except for the randomized min-max attack, under which Pd starts to drop
moderately at 18 colluders. When ∆ = 6, averaging is the most effective attack
and the fingerprinting system can resist only 7 colluders with Pd ≈ 1, as shown in
Figure 6.4(b). We also observe that the probability of detection does not degrade
gracefully with the number of colluders for averaging and median attacks, and there
is an abrupt drop around 10 colluders. By symmetry, the behavior of Pd under
maximum attack is identical to that under minimum attack and is hence omitted
from the figure. Under the Min-Max and modified negative attacks, Pd = 1 for up
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Figure 6.5: Probability of catching an attacker under averaging attack for different
quantization step size ∆.
to 30 colluders in both scenarios and have been omitted from the figures for clarity.
From Figure 6.4(a) and (b), we observe that the value of the quantization step
size has a significant influence on the detection performance. To understand the
influence of the quantization step size ∆, in Figure 6.5 we compare the probability
of detection under averaging attack for different quantization step sizes at constant
D(∆) = 15. We observe that for weak quantization (∆ = 1), the performance
is similar to that obtained for uncompressed hosts. When stronger compression
is applied and the host signal values become more discrete, the averaging attack
becomes more powerful. When ∆ = 6, the fingerprinting system can be defeated
by averaging just 10 copies. Further, as will be shown in Section 7.2, the averaging
attack introduces the lowest distortion, making it a very powerful attack against
fingerprint systems for compressed signals.
To gain insight into the reduced collusion resistance for compressed host sig-
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(a) Averaging attack, ∆ = 6.












(b) Averaging attack, ∆ = 1.












(c) Minimum attack, ∆ = 6.












(d) Minimum attack, ∆ = 1.
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(f) Randomized min-max attack,
∆ = 1.
Figure 6.6: Distribution of colluded fingerprint after averaging, minimum and
randomized min-max attacks by 25 colluders.
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nals, we examine in Figure 6.6 the histogram of the extracted fingerprint signal
(without additive noise) for 25 users’ collusion [87] using the same settings as be-
fore. Under averaging collusion for ∆ = 6, we see from Figure 6.6(a) that most of
the fingerprint components are zero and completely removed from the host media
after collusion, leading to a failure in identifying colluders. However, when ∆ = 1,
Figure 6.6(b) shows that approximately half of the colluded fingerprint components
remain non-zero under averaging collusion, which enables the detector to catch at
least one of the 25 colluders with high probability. A similar trend is observed
under the minimum and randomized min-max attacks for ∆ = 6 and ∆ = 1, as
shown in Figs. 6.6(c) through (e). Comparing the histograms for averaging and
minimum attacks under ∆ = 6, we can see that while averaging collusion removes
almost all fingerprint traces (Figure 6.6(a)), the minimum attack still retains some
fingerprint components and is thus less effective than averaging collusion (Figure
6.6(c)). Similar inferences can be drawn regarding the other attacks by studying
their histograms, which explains the results reported in Figure 6.4(a) and (b) for
the probability of catching one colluder.
6.4 Anti-collusion dither
In the previous section, we have shown that even at moderate compression,
quantized Gaussian fingerprints may be removed by averaging a few different finger-
printed copies. The main reason that the traditional Gaussian based fingerprinting
fails for compressed host signals is because of the discrete nature of the signals
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before and after fingerprint embedding. When the quantization step size becomes
larger, e.g. ∆ = 6, we notice that the Gaussian distributed fingerprints are mostly
quantized to 0, especially after multi-user collusion as shown in Figure 6.6(a). This
does not happen for uncompressed host signals, because the relatively continuous
nature of the host signal helps retain some of the fingerprint information even after
the fingerprinted signal goes through compression. Inspired by this observation, we
introduce a new fingerprinting technique that mimics the case of uncompressed host
signals by adding a pseudo-random dither sequence to the compressed host signal
before embedding fingerprints. We will show, through analysis and simulation that
the proposed scheme has higher collusion resistance.
6.4.1 Fingerprint Embedding
We illustrate the proposed technique using an example. We model the prob-
ability distribution function (p.d.f.) of the host signal prior to quantization by a
Laplacian distribution, which has been shown to be a good model for DCT coeffi-





, and after quantization, fSj . We make the quantized host signal
appear more continuous to the fingerprint embedder by convolving it with a narrow
rectangular distribution to approximate the distribution of the host signal before
quantization.





), and let S ′j = Sj + dj. The p.d.f. of S
′
j is given as fS′j(x) = fSj (x) ⊗
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Figure 6.7: Distribution of the host signal before quantization, after quantization
and after adding dither.
fdj (x), where fdj is the p.d.f. of dj and ⊗ denotes convolution. The p.d.f. fS′j (x)
is a staircase function that approximates the original host distribution as shown in
Figure 6.7. We refer to the signal d as Anti-Collusion Dither (ACD), and as will
be shown subsequently, this dither signal that is added to the quantized host signal
helps improve the collusion resistance of the system.
We construct the fingerprinted signal, X′(k), by adding the ACD signal and
the Gaussian fingerprint Q
(k)












As the Sj are multiples of ∆, the effective changes, Wd
(k), made on the signal sent









×∆, with its energy constrained
by E[‖Wd(k)‖2] ≤ M · D(∆). Upon obtaining the attacked signal Z, the detector
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(a) Without ACD. (b)With ACD.
Figure 6.8: Distribution of the effective fingerprint for a single user (a) without
ACD and (b) with ACD for ∆ = 6.
extracts the fingerprint and declares user q to be guilty if









〈h(Z− S− d),Wd(k)〉, (6.6)
where h(·) is the preprocessing applied to make the histogram of the test signal
symmetric around zero as explained in Section 6.2. The second equation is obtained
from the fact that the dither term is independent of the user index k and hence does
not affect the maximization.
6.4.2 Colluder Identification Accuracy
We test the fingerprinting system with the proposed ACD technique using the
settings described in Section 6.3. Figure 6.8(a) and (b) show the histograms of the
effective fingerprint for a single user without ACD (W) and with ACD (Wd − d),
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respectively. We observe that the effective fingerprintWd−d is now more continuous
in nature, and thus the collusion resistance is improved [87]. Figure 6.9(a) and (b)
compare the probability of catching one colluder Pd, with and without ACD for
∆ = 6 at a WNR of 0dB. We observe that the probability of catching one colluder
has increased significantly for fingerprinting with ACD as opposed to fingerprinting
without ACD. The collusion resistance against averaging and median attacks is
now quadrupled and the system with ACD can resist over 30 attackers’ collusion
compared to only 7 when without ACD. We observe that the performance against
minimum and maximum attacks also improves and the Pd against Min-Max attack
continues to be close to 1. However, the probability of detection under modified
negative attack is reduced slightly.
A similar performance improvement for ACD is observed at lower WNR levels.
For example, when WNR = -5dB, the collusion resistance without dithering reduces
further to only 7 colluders, whereas fingerprinting with ACD can resist around 13
colluders. For averaging attack with coalition size larger than 5, Pd without ACD
reduces sharply to close to 0, whereas Pd with ACD degrades gracefully and is
around 0.6 for 30 colluders.
We also compare the performance improvement of ACD under different attacks
when the overall distortion introduced by the collusion attacks are kept the same.
Using a similar evaluation framework as in [98], the power of the additional noise
n added to the attacked signal after collusion is varied, such that the overall dis-
tortion introduced into the signal by the different attacks are approximately equal.
Figure 6.10 shows the probability of detection for fingerprinting with and without
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Minmax with and without ACD
Modneg without ACD
(a) (b)
Figure 6.9: Performance improvement for fingerprinting using ACD at WNR =
0dB.















































Figure 6.10: Comparison of Pd when the overall distortion introduced into the
signal is approximately equal under different attacks for (a) Fingerprinting without
ACD and (b) Fingerprinting with ACD.
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ACD when the overall distortion introduced into the signal is approximately 4 times
the power of the watermark, or equivalently, the overall watermark to noise ratio
is approximately −6dB. From Figure 6.10(a), we observe that the attacks follow
the same trend under fingerprinting without ACD as when a constant amount of
noise was added (Figure 6.4). Due to the higher noise power, the averaging attack
leads to a lower probability of detection and the overall collusion resistance is now
reduced to 5 colluders. Under fingerprinting with ACD, we observe that the overall
collusion resistance is 13 colluders and the probability of detection is increased for
all collusion attacks except the modified negative attack. As shall be seen from the
theoretical analysis in Chapter 7, the modified negative attack leads to a higher
variance in the detection statistics and hence a lower probability of detection. This
suggests that the distortion constraints in higher fidelity applications may prevent
the attackers from employing the modified negative attack, although if the overall
allowable distortion in the attacked signal is large, modified negative would be the
colluders’ preferred attack against ACD-based fingerprinting systems.
6.4.3 Colluders’ Choice of Quantization Step Size ∆c
So far, we have only considered the case where the attackers use the same
quantization step size to requantize the colluded signal as that chosen by the content
owner, i.e. ∆c = ∆. In this subsection, we examine the case where the attackers
choose a different quantization step size ∆c 6= ∆. We use the non-blind correlation
detector to identify one guilty user. In our experiments, we set the fingerprint length
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M = 10000 and the number of users is N = 1024. The host signal is modelled after
the DCT coefficients of the AC1,1 band in the Lena image, such that the host follows
a Laplacian distribution with variance 61. The host is then quantized with step size
∆ = 6 and the fingerprint is embedded. The embedding power is chosen to satisfy
the maximum distortion constraint D(∆) = 15.
Figure 6.11 shows the probability of catching at least one colluder for various
choices of the quantization step size by the colluders at additive noise power of 0dB.
Figure 6.11(a) depicts the results under averaging collusion for fingerprinting with-
out ACD. From the figure, we observe that attackers’ choice of ∆c = ∆ = 6 leads to
the lowest probability of detection. Further, we see that the probability of detection
for the cases when ∆c and ∆ are co-prime is higher than for other choices of ∆.
Figure 6.11(b) shows the results under median collusion for fingerprinting without
ACD. We observe that the results are similar regardless of the choice of ∆c by the
colluders. Figure 6.11(c) and (d) show the results for the case of fingerprinting using
ACD under averaging and median collusion, respectively. The collusion resistance
of the system improves significantly for some choices of ∆c under averaging collu-
sion and for all ∆c under median attack. More importantly, the performance is now
comparable for all ∆c. Thus, from an attacker’s perspective, the choice of ∆c = ∆
is no worse than any other choice of ∆c in terms of Pd and is preferable based on
bandwidth and quality considerations, as discussed earlier. In view of these results,
in the remainder of the chapter, we only consider the case of ∆c = ∆.
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(a) Averaging collusion (without ACD) (b) Median collusion (without ACD)






















































(c) Averaging collusion (with ACD) (d) Median collusion (with ACD)
Figure 6.11: Probability of successfully catching one colluder when ∆c 6= ∆ and
additive noise power is equal to the watermark power for (a) averaging and (b)
median collusion for fingerprinting without ACD, and (c) averaging and (d) median
collusion for fingerprinting with ACD.
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6.5 Simulation Results on Images
So far, we have focused on the case of one channel, which may represent one
feature or one frequency band. We now examine the performance of the proposed
technique on actual images, where the fingerprint is embedded in a set of different
frequency bands.
We use images of size 320 × 320 compressed with JPEG quality factor of 75
as host images, as this compression setting is the default in many applications to
provide a good tradeoff between perceptual quality and bandwidth. The fingerprint
is embedded in the middle frequency bands of the 8x8 block DCT domain, guided by
the Human Visual System (HVS) model [66]. The embedding distortion is measured








2. The embedding PSNR is set to 42dB and the fingerprint energy in each
frequency band is allocated based on the corresponding quantization step size.
Figure 6.12 shows the fraction of the coefficients used for embedding that
belong to a channel with a given quantization step size ∆ for the Lena test image.
From the figure, we observe that approximately 25% of the coefficients used for
embedding have ∆ = 6. The other coefficients come from channels with larger
quantization step sizes, or stronger compression, and hence we expect the overall
performance of both the fingerprinting schemes to be lower than that obtained for
the one channel ∆ = 6 case presented in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
Figure 6.13 shows parts of Lena and baboon images before and after fingerprint
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Figure 6.12: Fraction of the coefficients used for embedding belonging to channels
with different quantization step sizes for the cropped Lena image.
embedding, with and without the proposed ACD technique. Figure 6.13(a) and (b)
are the original JPEG compressed images, Figure 6.13(c) and (d) are images fin-
gerprinted using quantized Gaussian fingerprints without ACD, and Figure 6.13(e)
and (f) are images fingerprinted using the proposed ACD technique. We observe
no perceptual difference between the original compressed image and the two fin-
gerprinted images. Table 6.1 compares the file sizes of the resulting JPEG images.
The numbers in parenthesis indicate the percentage change in the file size. From
the table, we see that the file size of the JPEG compressed fingerprinted image is
not significantly different from the original image, and thus the bandwidth required
for transmission in our proposed scheme will be approximately the same as the
requirement for transmitting the original host.
Figure 6.14 shows the average probability of catching at least one colluder
for the various attacks described in Eqn. (6.2) when the additive noise power is




Figure 6.13: Parts of Lena and baboon images before and after fingerprint em-
bedding. (a) and (b) Original compressed images at a JPEG quality factor of 75.
(c) and (d) Fingerprinted images without ACD and (e) and (f) fingerprinted images
with ACD. (Embedding PSNR = 42dB.)
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Table 6.1: Comparison of file size (in Bytes) of original and fingerprinted JPEG
images.
Image Original Size Fingerprinted image size Fingerprinted image size
(without ACD) (with ACD)
Lena 16,007 15,973 (-0.21%) 16,014 (+0.04%)
Baboon 24,592 24,631 (+0.15%) 24,588 (-0.02%)
Barbara 18,921 18,938 (+0.09%) 18,963 (+0.22%)















































Figure 6.14: Simulation results for images: average probability of catching at least
one colluder for fingerprinting with and without ACD under various attacks for the
Lena test image.
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presented in Section 6.3 for the one channel case, but the exact probabilities seen in
Figure 6.14 are slightly lower due to the different quantization step sizes of different
frequency locations in the DCT of the image. From Figure 6.14, we observe that
using ACD, the overall collusion resistance has approximately doubled from 7 to
13 colluders. The probability of detection has increased for all attacks, except the
modified negative attack. Under the modified negative attack, the probability of
detection reduces by around 20% for attack by 20 colluders. However, as discussed
in Section 7.2, the distortion introduced by this attack under ACD is higher than
without ACD. The increase in Pd for the randomized negative attack is also lower
compared to the other attacks, due to the higher distortion introduced by this attack.
6.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we examined the problem of collusion resistant fingerprint de-
sign for compressed multimedia. Our studies indicate that adding Gaussian spread
spectrum fingerprints, that are effective for uncompressed signals, and recompressing
the fingerprinted signal leads to a low collusion resistance. This can be mainly at-
tributed to the discrete nature of the fingerprint. After multi-user collusion attacks,
the fingerprint traces are completely removed from the media, making it difficult
to identify users participating in the collusion. We found that the averaging and
median attacks are particularly effective from the colluders’ perspective, and the
fingerprint can be removed by averaging around 10 copies.
To remedy this shortcoming, we propose an Anti-Collusion Dither technique
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to improve the collusion resistance. A pseudorandom dither signal is added to the
compressed host before fingerprint embedding to make it appear more continuous
from the embedder’s perspective. The dither also makes the effective fingerprint
more continuous, thereby improving its collusion resistance. Simulation results us-
ing JPEG compressed images demonstrate that the file-size of the image is not
significantly altered by the fingerprinting and the perceptual quality is preserved.
The proposed ACD technique can approximately quadruple the collusion resistance
under the averaging and median attacks as compared to fingerprinting using quan-
tized Gaussian fingerprints without ACD. Similar results have been obtained for the
minimum, maximum, min-max and randomized min-max collusion attacks.
In large-scale applications involving compressed multimedia, the proposed
technique can be combined with other coding schemes to create efficient and scal-
able fingerprinting systems with high collusion resistance. For example, for uncom-
pressed hosts, the fingerprint construction and detection technique of [34] builds
on Gaussian spreading sequences and employs ECC-based construction to support
millions of users. Analogously, the proposed ACD-based fingerprinting can be used
in conjunction with error correcting codes, Boneh-Shaw codes, or Tardos codes for






In the previous chapter, we have introduced the technique of ACD and demon-
strated through simulations that the probability of identifying a colluder is higher
for fingerprinting with ACD compared to without ACD. In this section, we provide
a theoretical analysis of the two schemes for fingerprinting compressed multimedia
from different perspectives. First, we derive expressions for the probability of detec-
tion for the two fingerprinting schemes. We then bring in an estimation viewpoint
from the colluders’ perspective, to compare the accuracy with which the attack-
ers can estimate the host signal. We also evaluate fingerprinting with and without
ACD from an information theoretic viewpoint in terms of the maximum number
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of distinct users that the system can accommodate, such that the asymptotic error
probability goes to zero.
7.1 Probability of Detection
We now derive the probability mass function (p.m.f.) of the fingerprints and
compute the probability of detecting one of the guilty users after a collusion at-
tack [85]. Let h(·) denote the preprocessing applied to the test signal to make its
distribution symmetric around zero, as described in Section 6.2. The test signal
used by the detector can be represented as
h(Z− S) = h(V + n− S) = h(g({W(k)}k∈UK)) + n,
since the attacks satisfy g({X(k)j }k∈UK) = Sj + g({W (k)j }k∈UK). We have also used
the approximation h(n) ≈ n−E[n]1 = n, where 1 represents a vector of all ones and
the fact that the noise n has mean equal to zero. Denoting g′(·) = h(g(·)), we have




′({W (k)j }k∈UK) + nj)×W (α)j . As
the components W
(α)
j are i.i.d., from the Central Limit Theorem, T
(α) approaches
a Gaussian distribution when the fingerprint length M is large. Further, the mean
and variance of the Gaussian distribution are independent of j due to the i.i.d.
property, and depend only on whether α belongs to the set of colluders UK or not.
After dropping the subscript j to simplify the notation, the mean and variance of
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T (α) for α /∈ UK are given by
mean: µ0 = E[g








E[(g′({W (k)}k∈UK))2 + n2]E[(W (α))2].
Here, the equalities follow due to the independence assumption and that W (α) has
a zero mean. Similarly, for α ∈ UK ,
µ1 = E[g
′({W (k)}k∈UK)W (α)] + E[n]E[W (α)],
= E[g′({W (k)}k∈UK)W (α)],
as the noise n is independent of W (α) and has zero mean. The variance of the















E[(g′({W (k)}k∈UK)W (α))2] + E[n2]E[(W (α))2]− µ21
)
.




1 can be computed from the joint distribution of
g({W (k)}k∈UK) and W (α), α ∈ UK and the distribution of g({W (k)}k∈UK ). The prob-
ability of successfully catching one colluder is then given by the probability that the
detection statistic for one of the colluders is larger than the detection statistics of
all the innocent users:
Pd = Pr(max
k∈UK




7.1.1 Analysis of Quantized Gaussian Fingerprints
Consider the scenario of quantized Gaussian fingerprints under the averaging


















. The characteristic function of W ′, M ′(t) =
E[exp(itW ′)] is related to the characteristic function of W (α), M(t), as M ′(t) =
[M( t
K
)]K , where K is the number of colluders. The probability mass function























The joint p.m.f. Pr(Wavg = m∆,W (α) = n∆), α ∈ UK , can be written as the prod-
uct of the conditional distribution Pr(Wavg = m∆|W (α) = n∆) and the marginal
distribution Pr(W (α) = n∆). Here, the conditional distribution can be computed as
Pr(Wavg = m∆|W (α) = n∆)=Pr
(



















































The p.m.f. of the colluded fingerprints under other attacks can be derived similarly.
The detailed derivations are omitted here due to space constraints.
Based on these derivations, we compute the probability of detection Pd for the
settings described in Section 6.3. We choose the fingerprint length M = 10000, the
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Figure 7.1: Probability of catching one colluder using traditional Gaussian based
fingerprints at WNR = 0dB, 1024 users, M = 104, D(∆) = 15.
number of users N = 1024, and the distortion D(∆) = 15. To obtain numerical
results, the integrals in the expressions for the probability distributions are evaluated
using the trapezoidal rule. Figure 7.1 shows the probability of successfully catching
one colluder (Pd) versus the number of users participating in the collusion for various
attacks. The power of additive noise is set to be the same as the power of the
watermark, i.e., the Watermark-to-Noise Ratio (WNR) is set to 0 dB for each of
the attacks. From the figure, we observe that the probability of catching a guilty
user is the lowest for averaging attack and the system can resist only 7 colluders
with Pd ≈ 1. The median attack is also very effective at removing traces of the
fingerprints. The minimum and maximum attacks are less effective, and the modified
negative and the min-max attacks are the least effective attacks. These results agree
very well with that obtained through simulations, presented in Section 6.3.
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7.1.2 Performance Analysis under Anti-Collusion Dithering
With Anti-Collusion Dithering, we follow a similar approach to compute the
probability of catching one colluder. We illustrate our analysis by deriving the
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The last term can be computed by first obtaining the characteristic function and
then computing the p.m.f. from the characteristic function as illustrated earlier. A
similar analysis can be carried out for the other nonlinear attacks.
Figure 7.2 shows the probability of catching one colluder versus the number
of colluders for fingerprinting using ACD. We observe that the collusion resistance
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Figure 7.2: Probability of catching one colluder for fingerprinting with ACD at
WNR = 0dB, 1024 users, M = 104, D(∆) = 15.
against averaging and median attacks has now quadrupled from 7 to approximately
30 colluders. The collusion resistance for the minimum and maximum attacks has
also increased. As before, we observe that the probability of detection has slightly
reduced for the modified negative attack. These results are consistent with the
simulation results presented in Section 6.4.
7.2 Estimation Accuracy of Various Collusion Attacks
Collusion attacks to remove traces of the fingerprints can be formulated as
the colluders’ attempt to estimate the host signal given their fingerprinted versions.
The accuracy with which attackers can estimate the host signal was suggested as one
of the criteria for determining optimal collusion attacks for uncompressed domain
fingerprinting in [41], but no explicit evaluation of the estimation accuracy was
provided for different collusion attacks. In this subsection, we examine collusion
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from the attackers’ perspective and evaluate the effectiveness of collusion attacks on
compressed domain fingerprinting systems in terms of the accuracy of estimating
the host signal. We provide an explicit evaluation and quantitative comparison of
the estimation accuracy of different collusion attacks.
As before, denote the host signal sample by Sj, and the fingerprinted sig-
nal for user k by X
(k)
j . Let the estimate of the host signal be represented as
Ŝj = G
′({X(k)j }k∈UK), where G′(·) is some suitable estimator. The accuracy of
the estimate, or equivalently, the effectiveness of the collusion attack can be mea-
sured in terms of the Mean Squared Error (MSE), given by ε = E[(Sj − Ŝj)2]. The
collusion attacks defined in (6.2) can be considered as estimators if we set G′(·) =
h(g(·)) for the collusion attack g(·). These estimators satisfy G′({X(k)j }k∈UK ) =
Sj + G
′({W (k)j }k∈UK). Thus, the MSE of estimation simply becomes the variance
of the colluded fingerprint which can be computed using the distribution of the
colluded signal as derived in Section 7.1.
Figure 7.3 shows the MSE of various estimators as a function of the number of
colluders for the experimental setup described in Section 7.1. From Figure 7.3(a),
we see that averaging collusion has the lowest MSE, followed by median, minimum,
min-max, and modified negative attacks for fingerprinting using independent Gaus-
sian based fingerprints. Figure 7.3(b) shows the corresponding MSEs under ACD
fingerprinting. Comparing Figure 7.3(a) and Figure 7.3(b) we observe that the MSEs
of all the estimators are significantly higher with ACD than without the dithering.
The MSE of estimation for the averaging and median attacks, which are close to
zero with just 11 fingerprinted copies for fingerprinting without ACD, remain non-
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(a) Without ACD (b) With ACD.
Figure 7.3: MSE (ε) of various estimators for fingerprinting (a) without ACD and
(b) with ACD for ∆ = 6.
zero even with 30 colluders for fingerprinting with ACD. The MSE for other attacks
approximately triples and thus the attacks are not effective at estimating the host
signal for the ACD fingerprinting system.
The distortion introduced by the collusion attack, measured with respect to
the host, is given by the second moment of the colluded fingerprint and is equal
to the sum of the MSE and the square of the mean. For averaging, median, min-
max and modified negative, the mean of the colluded fingerprint is zero and the
distortion introduced is equal to the MSE. For the minimum and maximum attacks,
the colluded fingerprint has non-zero mean and the overall distortion increases with
the number of colluders.
From Figure 7.3(a), we observe that averaging introduces the lowest distortion
for fingerprinting without ACD. The averaging attack also has the lowest probability
174
of detection for a given distortion, as shown in Figure 6.10(a). Thus, the averaging
attack is the best choice for the colluders under fingerprinting without ACD. When
ACD is used, the colluders’ strategy is not so simple. Although Figure 7.3(b) shows
that the lowest distortion is again introduced by the averaging attack and that the
modified negative attack has the highest distortion, we recall from Figure 6.10(b)
that the modified negative attack has a lower probability of detection at a given level
of distortion. This is because, unlike the averaging and median attacks which aim to
estimate the host signal, the modified negative attack attempts to move the attacked
signal in a direction opposite to that of a majority of the colluders’ fingerprints.
This results in a higher overall distortion, as shown in Figure 7.3. Despite this
high distortion, for Gaussian fingerprints, due to the symmetry of the colluders’
fingerprints, the resultant attacked signal may still have sufficient correlation with
some colluder’s fingerprint, enabling us to catch one of the colluders with high
probability. However after applying ACD, the additive dither reduces the statistical
symmetry among the colluders’ effective fingerprint. This reduced symmetry makes
the resulting direction of the modified negative attack less likely to be correlated with
the colluders’ fingerprint and reduces the probability of detection. Therefore, the
adversaries’ best strategy in an ACD fingerprinting system depends on the distortion
allowable by their attacks. If the distortion introduced by the modified negative
attack is within the attackers’ distortion constraint, the modified negative attack
would be more favorable from the colluders’ perspective. On the other hand, if the
allowable distortion is small, it is advantageous for the attackers to choose averaging
collusion instead.
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7.3 Comparison based on Mutual Information
In this subsection, we leverage the capacity results for fingerprinting finite
alphabet from the literature to analyze the performance enhancement achieved by
the proposed ACD techniques from an information theoretic standpoint.
For fingerprinting signals drawn from finite alphabets, the private fingerprint-
ing game with non-blind detection was considered in [75], and the public finger-
printing game with blind detection was analyzed in [97]. In practice, due to bit rate
and dynamic range limitations, compressed host signals can only take values from a
finite set and the results from [75] are applicable in this case. The formulation in [75]
considers a fingerprinting code of length M with N sequences such that N = 2MR,
where R is the rate of the code. The fingerprinted sequences are generated from the
i.i.d. host signal S under a specified distortion constraint and the colluded version
created by K users is also subject to a similar distortion constraint. A fingerprint-
ing rate R is defined as “achievable” if the probability of not detecting any of the
colluders tends to zero as the length of the fingerprint M approaches infinity.
The fingerprinting capacity as a function of the distortion constraints and the
probability distribution of the host is defined to be the supremum of all achiev-
able rates. Under memoryless collusion attacks by K colluders, and fingerprinting
using constant composition codes, the capacity Cfp is shown to be related to the







I(Z;X1, X2, . . . , XK |S). (7.3)
Here p(X|S) is the conditional p.m.f. of the fingerprinted signal given the host
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signal, p(Z|X1, X2, . . . , XK) is the conditional p.m.f. of the attacked signal given the
fingerprints of the colluders, and I(X ; Y ) denotes the mutual information between
two random variables X and Y . The evaluation of the fingerprinting capacity (Eqn.
(7.3)) is non-trivial even for simple settings. To the best of our knowledge, the
capacity has not been determined for any host distribution with finite support,
except for the case of binary hosts, and consequently capacity achieving fingerprint
designs are unknown.
Inspired by connections drawn by the theoretical studies between the best
achievable fingerprinting rate and the conditional mutual information, we propose
to employ mutual information to guide the development and analysis of practical
fingerprinting algorithms for quantized hosts. For a given fingerprinting scheme and
a given attack, it can be shown that the rate 1
K
I(Z;X1, X2, . . . , XK |S) provides a
tight upper bound on the maximum number of users that the fingerprinting system
can support [75]. This rate, denoted as Rmax, is thus an indicator of the collusion
resistance of the fingerprinting scheme under the given attack, as a higher value of
Rmax suggests that a larger number of users can be supported by the corresponding
embedding scheme. We now use Rmax to compare the two designs of fingerprint-
ing codes for compressed hosts, namely, quantized gaussian fingerprints with and
without ACD fingerprinting.
Consider the noise-free averaging collusion attack, which can be represented
as





X1 +X2 + . . .+Xk
K∆
)








1 z = 0
0 z 6= 0
.
The maximum fingerprinting rate in terms of the conditional mutual information















where H(X) denotes the entropy of a random variable X , and the last equation
follows from the fact that Z is a deterministic function of X1, X2, . . . , XK and
hence H(Z|X1, X2, . . . , XK , S) = 0. Noting that the averaging attack satisfies
g(X1, X2, . . . , XK) = S + g(W1,W2, . . . ,WK) = S + W




max = H(S +W
avg | S),
= H(Wavg), (7.6)
which can be evaluated numerically from the p.m.f. of the attacked fingerprint
Wavg as derived in Section 7.1 (Eqn. (7.1) and (7.2)). This analysis can be carried
out in a similar fashion for the remaining attacks.
We present results for the averaging and median attacks, which are shown to
be the most effective attacks by our simulation results (Section 6.3) and analytical
study (Section 7.1). Figure 7.4 shows the rate function Rmax for averaging and
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Averaging attack with ACD
Median attack with ACD
Median attack without ACD
Averaging attack without ACD
with ACD
without ACD
Figure 7.4: The rate function Rmax for averaging and median attacks with and
without ACD.
median attacks with and without ACD. We observe that the rate is higher for
fingerprinting with ACD than without ACD, suggesting that fingerprinting with
ACD is more resilient to averaging and median attacks.
7.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have performed a theoretical analysis of collusion-resistant
fingerprinting techniques for compressed multimedia from various viewpoints, and
demonstrated the significant advantages of the ACD technique. We first showed
that ACD increases the probability of identifying a colluder using the correlation
detector and the colluded copy, as compared to fingerprinting without dithering.
ACD also reduces the accuracy with which attackers can estimate the host signal,






In this dissertation, we examined two complementary approaches for multi-
media protection using content and embedded fingerprints. Content fingerprints
can be used to prevent the redistribution of multimedia through the internet, while
embedded fingerprints can be used to trace individual copies and deter users from
unauthorized redistribution.
This dissertation describes a framework for theoretical modeling and analysis
of content fingerprints, whereby each individual module is studied to understand
its influence on the identification accuracy. Under this framework, the impact of
distortion of the content on the features, the resulting changes in the fingerprints
computed, and the eventual effect on the matching process and identification accu-
racy can be examined separately. Accordingly, we studied how distortions in the
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features affect the fingerprints and identified the correlation between the features
and the noise as an important factor. We then considered the problem of encod-
ing the features into fingerprints and proposed an iterative algorithm to design the
quantizer such that the identification performance is improved.
In the content identification problem, the fingerprint system designer and an
adversary seeking to upload content and evade detection have conflicting objectives.
We studied these interactions under a game-theoretic framework by modeling con-
tent identification as a two-player game. The designer and the adversary choose
strategies to optimize their respective objective functions. Through this analysis,
we showed that choosing the fingerprint bits to be i.i.d. and equally likely to take
the values 0 or 1 is the optimal strategy for the designer.
Based on this result, we then studied the best identification performance
achievable using fingerprints with i.i.d. equiprobable bits. We modeled content
identification as a hypothesis testing problem and derived closed form expressions
for the probability of making an error. For ease of use in practical applications,
we derived bounds on the error probabilities and provided a lower bound on the
length of the fingerprint needed to achieve a desired accuracy. This analysis also
revealed the connections between content fingerprints and the problems of joint
source-channel coding and errors and erasures decoding.
As practical fingerprinting schemes generate fingerprints with correlated com-
ponents, we proposed a Markov Random Field model for the fingerprint and noise
distributions. To evaluate the associated probability of making a detection error, we
described a statistical physics inspired algorithm to estimate the density of states,
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and utilize the density of states to compute the probabilities of interest. We showed
through experiments using image databases that the detector developed using this
model can improve the detection accuracy.
The algorithm for estimating the density of states cannot be used with models
containing a large number of random variables. This makes it difficult to use the
MRF model for correlated fingerprints obtained from long sequences of multimedia.
We proposed modeling the distribution of these fingerprints using a Markov chain
model. Experiments indicated that the Markov chain model is a good fit only in
certain regimes. We then proposed an adaptive model and an associated detector
that provides the best detection accuracy over a wide range of operating points.
When an unauthorized copy of a multimedia document is detected using,
for example, content fingerprints, embedded collusion-resistant fingerprints may be
used to further identify the users responsible for the redistribution. Existing collu-
sion resistant fingerprints were designed and tested using uncompressed multimedia,
whereas most practical applications utilize compressed multimedia. Our study indi-
cated that directly utilizing traditional schemes for embedding fingerprints in com-
pressed signals leads to low collusion-resistance. To improve the collusion-resistance,
we developed an Anti-Collusion Dithering technique for embedding fingerprints in
compressed multimedia. The proposed technique approximately triples the number
of colluders that can be resisted under many attacks. We also performed a the-
oretical analysis from different perspectives, and showed that the ACD technique
increases the probability of detecting a colluder, reduces the accuracy with which
colluders may estimate the host signal, and increases the fingerprinting capacity.
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The analysis framework for content fingerprints described in this dissertation
provides a foundation for further exploration and study. In particular, examining
how distortions of the multimedia translate into changes in the features extracted
is of considerable interest to the content fingerprinting community. Similarly, the
robustness of different features to various processing can also be studied under the
same framework. In this thesis, we adopted a model suitable for the study of features
based on spatial or transform domain properties. Recently, many fingerprinting
algorithms have advocated the use of local interest point based features such as
SIFT [52], SURF [6] and other spatio-temporal features [46, 53]. Typically, these
features are represented by vector quantization as “visual words” [63]. It would be
interesting to study how distortion in these features would impact the fingerprints
computed and the overall matching accuracy.
The game-theoretic modeling of content fingerprinting also holds promise and
can potentially reveal interesting insights and guidelines for the design of fingerprint-
ing schemes. The models developed for correlated fingerprints could be incorporated
into the game framework to extend the analysis to non-i.i.d. fingerprints. In the
game-theoretic study described in this dissertation, a simple model was adopted
for the relation between the distortion in the fingerprints and the reduction in the
adversary’s payoff. As shown in Section 2.3, for many feature distributions of prac-
tical interest, it is possible to analyze this relation more carefully. The results of this
analysis could be incorporated into the game-theoretic framework and create a more
holistic model of the choices and payoffs for the designer and adversary. Another
aspect of interest is to analyze how the behavior of the adversary and designer can
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evolve over time, as they learn from each other’s strategies. Tools from evolutionary
game theory [99] can be used to model such a time-varying behavior of the designer
and adversary.
In content-fingerprinting applications, as the adversary typically has access to
the results of the detector, he/she can repeatedly probe the detector with different
inputs to better understand the algorithms and estimate the internal parameters.
This knowledge could be exploited to design smart attacks for defeating the content
identification system while minimizing the distortion introduced into the content.
Such attacks have been studied under the name of “sensitivity attacks” in the water-
marking literature [19], and various randomization techniques have been proposed
for mitigating such attacks [49, 93]. Sensitivity attacks are also possible in the con-
tent fingerprinting context, but have not been systematically studied. As these
attacks can be potentially devastating, it is of interest to study whether such at-
tacks can be mitigated using randomization techniques, similar to those proposed for
watermarking. A related question is whether introducing randomization techniques
in any of the various stages of fingerprinting would improve the overall security of
the system and benefit the fingerprint designer. The overall modeling framework
and the game-theoretic approach could be used to obtain a better understanding of
these issues.
The connections to joint source channel coding revealed by the study of the
identification accuracy and quantizer design provide another avenue for further ex-
ploration. Error correcting codes have been used to quantize and improve the ro-
bustness of hashes designed for authentication in the robust image hashing litera-
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ture [78]. We envision that similar concepts borrowed from the extensive literature
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[59] M. K. Mihçak and R. Venkatesan. New iterative geometric methods for robust
perceptual image hashing. In ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in
Digital Rights Management, 2001.
[60] R. Mohan. Video sequence matching. In IEEE International Conference on
Acoustic, Speech and Signal Processing, volume 6, pages 3697–3700, May 1998.
[61] P. Moulin. Universal fingerprinting: Capacity and random-coding exponents.
preprint, Jan. 2008.
[62] P. Moulin. Statistical modeling and analysis of content identification. In
Information Theory and Applications Workshop, Feb. 2010.
[63] D. Nistér and H. Stewénius. Scalable recognition with a vocabulary tree. In
Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
2006.
[64] J. Oostveen, T. Kalker, and J. Haitsma. Feature extraction and a database
strategy for video fingerprinting. In Proceedings of the International Confer-
ence on Recent Advances in Visual Information Systems, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, volume 2314, pages 117–128, 2002.
[65] M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, first
edition, 2001.
[66] C. I. Podilchuk and W. Zeng. Image-adaptive watermarking using visual mod-
els. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16(4):525–539, May
1998.
[67] H. V. Poor. An Introduction to Signal Detection and Estimation. Springer,
second edition, 1994.
190
[68] R. Radhakrishnan and C. Bauer. Video fingerprinting based on moment in-
variants capturing appearance and motion. In IEEE International Conference
on Multimedia and Expo, pages 1532–1535, 2009.
[69] R. M. Roth. Introduction to Coding Theory. Cambridge University Press,
2006.
[70] R. Safavi-Naini and Y. Wang. Collusion secure q-ary fingerprinting for per-
ceptual content. In Proceedings of Security and Privacy in Digital Rights
Management, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 2320, pages 57–75,
Philadelphia, PA, Nov. 2001.
[71] G. Schaefer and M. Stich. UCID - An uncompressed colour image database. In
Proceedings SPIE, Storage and Retrieval Methods and Applications for Multi-
media, pages 472–480, 2004.
[72] G. Schwarz. Estimating the dimension of a model. Annals of Statistics, 6:461–
464, 1978.
[73] A. Shwartz and A. Weiss. Large Deviations for Performance Analysis. Chap-
man and Hall, 1995.
[74] S. R. Smoot and L. A. Rowe. Study of DCT coefficient distributions. In Pro-
ceedings of the SPIE/IS&T Symposium on Electronic Imaging, volume 2657,
San Jose, CA, Jan. 1996.
[75] A. Somekh-Baruch and N. Merhav. On the capacity game of private finger-
printing systems under collusion attacks. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 51(3):884–899, Mar. 2005.
[76] J. K. Su, J. J. Eggers, and B. Girod. Capacity of digital watermarks sub-
jected to an optimal collusion attack. In Proceedings of the European Signal
Processing Conference, 2000.
[77] A. Swaminathan, S. He, and M. Wu. Exploring QIM-based anti-collusion fin-
gerprinting for multimedia. In Proceedings of SPIE/IS&T, Security, Steganog-
raphy, and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents, volume 6072, San Jose,
CA, Jan. 2006.
[78] A. Swaminathan, Y. Mao, and M. Wu. Robust and secure image hashing.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 1(2):215–230, Jun.
2006.
[79] G. Tardos. Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes. In Proceedings of the 35th
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 116–125, 2003.
[80] The Motion Picture Association of America. The cost of movie piracy.
http://www.mpaa.org/press releases/leksummarympa.pdf, 2006.
191
[81] The Wall Street Journal. YouTube removes 30,000 files amid Japanese copy-
right concerns. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116133637777798831.html.
[82] The Wall Street Journal. Studios see big rise in estimates of losses to
movie piracy. http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB114662361192442291.html,
May 2006.
[83] W. Trappe, M. Wu, Z. J. Wang, and K. J. R. Liu. Anti-collusion fingerprinting
for multimedia. IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 51(4):1069–1087,
Apr. 2003.
[84] A. L. Varna, W.-H. Chuang, and M. Wu. A framework for theoretical anal-
ysis of content fingerprinting. In Proceedings of SPIE Media Forensics and
Security, Jan. 2010.
[85] A. L. Varna, S. He, A. Swaminathan, and M. Wu. Analysis of nonlinear
collusion attacks on fingerprinting systems for compressed multimedia. In
IEEE International Conference on Image Processing, volume 2, pages 133–
136, San Antonio, TX, Oct. 2007.
[86] A. L. Varna, S. He, A. Swaminathan, and M. Wu. Fingerprinting compressed
multimedia signals. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Secu-
rity, 4(3):330–345, Sept. 2009.
[87] A. L. Varna, S. He, A. Swaminathan, M. Wu, H. Lu, and Z. Lu. Collusion-
resistant fingerprinting for compressed multimedia signals. In IEEE Confer-
ence on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, pages 165–168, Honolulu,
HI, Apr. 2007.
[88] A. L. Varna, A. Swaminathan, and M. Wu. A decision-theoretic framework for
analyzing binary hash-based content identification systems. In ACMWorkshop
on Digital Rights Management, pages 67–76, Oct. 2008.
[89] A. L. Varna and M. Wu. Modeling content fingerprints using Markov ran-
dom fields. In IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and
Security, Dec. 2009.
[90] A. L. Varna and M. Wu. Theoretical modeling and analysis of content iden-
tification. In IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo, Jul.
2009.
[91] A. L. Varna and M. Wu. Modeling and analysis of correlated binary finger-
prints for content identification. to appear in IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Forensics and Security, 2011.
[92] A. L. Varna and M. Wu. Modeling temporal correlations in content finger-
prints. In IEEE International Conference on Acoustic, Speech and Signal
Processing, 2011. to appear.
192
[93] R. Venkatesan and M. H. Jakubowski. Randomized detection for spread-
spectrum watermarking: Defending against sensitivity and other attacks. In
IEEE Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2005.
[94] A. Vetro, S. C. Draper, S. Rane, and J. S. Yedidia. Securing biometric data. In
Pier Luigi Dragotti and Michael Gastpar, editors, Distributed Source Coding,
chapter 11, pages 293–323. Academic Press, Jan. 2009.
[95] S. Voloshynovskiy, O. Koval, F. Beekhof, and T. Pun. Robust perceptual
hashing as classification problem: Decision-theoretic and practical consider-
ations. In IEEE Workshop on Multimedia Signal Processing, pages 345–348,
Oct. 2007.
[96] F. Wang and D. P. Landau. Efficient, multiple-range random walk algorithm
to calculate the density of states. Physical Review Letters, 86(10):2050–2053,
Mar. 2001.
[97] Y. Wang and P. Moulin. Capacity and random-coding error exponent for
public fingerprinting games. In Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory, pages 1174–1178, Seattle, WA, Jul. 2006.
[98] Z. J. Wang, M. Wu, H. V. Zhao, W. Trappe, and K. J. R. Liu. Anti-collusion
forensics of multimedia fingerprinting using orthogonal modulation. IEEE
Transactions on Image Processing, 14(6):804–821, Jun. 2005.
[99] J. W. Wiebull. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, 1997.
[100] S. S. Wilks. The large-sample distribution of the likelihood ratio for testing
composite hypotheses. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 9(1):60–62,
1938.
[101] F. Willems, T. Kalker, J. Goseling, and J.-P. Linnartz. On the capacity of
a biometrical identification system. In IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, page 82, Jun. 2003.
[102] G. Winkler. Image Analysis, Random Fields and Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Methods: A Mathematical Introduction. Springer, second edition, 2003.
[103] M. Wu, W. Trappe, Z. J. Wang, and K. J. R. Liu. Collusion resistant finger-
printing for multimedia. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 21(2):15–27, Mar.
2004.
[104] Y. Yacobi. Improved Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting. In Proceedings of Topics
in Cryptology - CT-RSA, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 2020,
pages 378–391, San Francisco, CA, Apr. 2001.
[105] H. V. Zhao and K. J. R. Liu. Fingerprint multicast for secure video streaming.
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 15(1):12–29, Jan. 2006.
193
[106] H. V. Zhao, M. Wu, Z. J. Wang, and K. J. R. Liu. Forensic analysis of
nonlinear collusion attacks for multimedia fingerprinting. IEEE Transactions
on Image Processing, 14(5):646–661, May 2005.
194
